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I. INTRODUCTION
The two primary problems with providing health care in the
United States are cost and access., The cost of health care rose
dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s 2 and continues to increase,
3
making coset containment crucial to the availability of care.4 In
addition, many Americans are either entirely without health
insurance5 or are underinsured for catastrophic illness.6  While
individually these two issues are important, equally problematic is
1. Jeffrey Rubin, Paying for Care: Legal Developments in the Financing of Mental Health
Services, 28 Houston L. Rev. 143, 146 (1991) (citations omitted). A third issue is the need to
ensure the quality of health services, especially considering the need to cut costs
simultaneously. Often, attempts to improve quality can raise cost concerns, resulting in a
trade-off between the two. As the health care industry shifts increasingly toward managed care,
such quality-cost tradeoffs are of increasing occurrence and concern. James F. Blumstein,
Health Care Reform and Competing isions of Medical Cara" Antitrust and State Provider
Cooperation Legislation, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1459, 1466 (1994). In the area of mental health, the
issue of quality may be even more contentious than in the remainder of the health care
industry, because the proper treatment of mental illnesses can be highly elusive and cause
debate even within the mental health community. See John Petrila, Ethics, Money, and the
Problem of Coercion in Managed Behavioral Health Care, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. 359, 391 (1996)
(noting that "little apparent consensus" exists regarding the standards for treatment and
outcomes in mental health care).
2. Daniel Y. Patterson and Steven S. Sharfstein, The Future of Mental Health Care, in
Judith L. Feldman and Richard J. Fitzpatrick, eds., Managed Mental Health Care 335, 336
(American Psychiatric Press, 1992).
3. See Moderate Rise in Employer Health Costs Not Likely to Last, Foster Higgins Says, 5
Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) 158 (Jan. 27, 1997) (reporting a 2.5% increase in employer
health costs during 1996 and forecasting greater increases in the near future).
4. See David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair
Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 49, 49 (1996) (arguing that unless
the growth in the amount of resources devoted to health care is checked, useful and necessary
medical care will become unaffordable).
5. A recent study estimated that 40.3 million people in the United States are uninsured.
Uninsured Population Increased to 40.3 Million in 1995, EBRI Says, 4 Health Care Policy Rep.
(BNA) 1737 (Nov. 4, 1996). This figure represented a rise from 39.4 million in 1994. Id.
6. See generally Pamela F. Short and Jessica S. Banthin, New Estimates of the
Underinsured Younger Than 65 Years, 274 JAMA 1302 (1995). According to Short and Banthin,
18.5% of the population below the age of sixty-five were projected to be underinsured by their
private insurance for catastrophic illness in 1994. Id. at 1304. An individual was defined as
"underinsured" if she was at risk of out-of-pocket expenses exceeding 10% of her family income
in the event of a severe illness that has a one-in-one-hundred chance of occurring. Id. at 1302.
Including the uninsured, the authors concluded that one-third of those under age sixty-five are
inadequately insured in any given year. Id. at 1305.
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the tension that exists between them. Providing greater access to
additional services results either in a cost increase or the loss of other
services. 7 Ultimately, however, a general plan to contain costs can
address the two issues simultaneously because the ability to contain
costs can create greater access.8
The issues of access and cost are particularly pronounced in
insurance for mental health services. 9 For those Americans with
private insurance, most coverage is provided by employer-sponsored
health plans. 10 In these plans, mental health care is possibly the most
common target of coverage limitations on services and illnesses.,'
These limitations cap benefits for mental health care 2 at far lower
levels than those for traditional medical and surgical care. 3 Both the
7. See Orentlicher, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 50 (cited in note 4) (noting that health
care sources can be rationed either by cost or by devoting fewer resources to various categories
of illnesses and patients). Examples of this effect are obvious. Suppose a health plan does not
include mental health services. If these services are added without a corresponding decrease in
access to another service, the overall costs of the plan will increase, unless the insured do not
actually use the mental health services.
8. See Petrila, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 368 n.20 (cited in note 1) (noting that "there are
reports that cost containment and increased access to appropriate services are not mutually
exclusive").
9. See M. Susan Ridgely and Howard H. Goldman, Putting the Failure of National
Health Care Reform in Perspective: Mental Health Benefits and the 'Benefit" of Incrementalism,
40 St. Louis U. L. J. 407, 416-17 (1996) (discussing access problems peculiar to the mentally ill
that are heightened when policy efforts are focused on cost containment). Moreover, the
mentally ill are generally poor and less insured, and their disorders often impair their ability to
advocate and seek care for themselves. Id. One study estimated that, in 1994, 17.1% of the
privately insured were underinsured for inpatient mental health care, while 34.1% were
underinsured for outpatient care. Short and Banthin, 274 JAMA at 1304 tbl. 2 (cited in note 6).
These estimates were based on the percentage of those whose insurance provided for thirty days
or less of inpatient care and thirty or less outpatient visits. Id.
10. Thomas G. McGuire, Predicting the Cost of Mental Health Benefits, 72 Milbank Q. 3, 4
(1994). More specifically, studies have estimated that 64% of Americans receive some kind of
employer-sponsored coverage. Richard G. Frank and Thomas G. McGuire, Mandating Employer
Coverage of Mental Health Care, 9 Health Affairs 31, 32 (Spring 1990) (footnote omitted).
According to labor statistics from the 1980s, 97% of persons enrolled in employer plans received
some coverage for inpatient mental health care and 95% received partial coverage for outpatient
care. McGuire, 72 Milbank Q. at 5 (citation omitted).
11. See Ridgely and Goldman, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 415 (cited in note 9) (stating that of
all beneficiaries of medium to large commercial insurance companies, only 37% were covered for
inpatient mental health care and only 6% for outpatient services). In the 1950s, benefits for
mental health and alcohol and substance abuse disorders ("ADM benefits") were on par with
physical health benefits until overutilization led to limitations on ADM benefits. Id. at 411.
Though the 1970s and 1980s saw a general expansion in private health coverage, cost
containment efforts by the private sector in the mid-1980s shifted the burden of mental health
care costs back to the public sector. Steven S. Sharfstein and Anne M. Stoline, Reform Issues
for Insuring Mental Health Care, 11 Health Affairs 84, 86 (Fall 1992).
12. Though the discussion of mental health benefits often encompasses substance abuse
treatment, for purposes of this Note, substance abuse treatment is not included in "mental
health benefits" unless specifically indicated.
13. Leonard S. Rubenstein, Ending Discrimination Against Mental Health Treatment in
Publicly Financed Health Care, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. 315, 323 (1996). These limitations, for pur-
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need to keep premiums affordable and the perception that diagnosis
and treatment of mental health is less reliable and effective than
treatment of "regular" physical medical care are the primary reasons
for the commonality of these limitations.14
While commentators have advocated more equality in
insurance coverage, 15 the concept of parity between mental health
coverage and other medical coverage in insurance plans did not gain
national prominence until the 1990s, when the issue came to the
forefront of legal scholarship.16 In addition, mental health parity
finally had congressional allies on both sides of the aisle-most
notably, Republican Senator Pete Domenici of Arizona.17  Recent
parity efforts have focused on eliminating the use of mental illness
limitations-primarily annual and lifetime monetary caps, durational
inpatient and outpatient limits, coinsurance rates, and
deductibles18-that are set at lower levels than limitations on physical
health care.
poses of this Note, include annual and lifetime monetary caps, annual inpatient hospitalization
and outpatient visit caps (also referred to as "durational limits" or "day limits"), and unequal
coinsurance or copayment rates. Monetary caps limit the total amount of dollars that are
available for coverage of mental illness in a given year or lifetime. For example, in the typical
plan, the maximum reimbursement for mental/nervous conditions is $50,000, while the cap on
benefits for physical conditions is $1,000,000. Compromise on Senate Parity Provision Aims to
Keep Issue Alive in Conference, 4 Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) 1185, 1185-86 (July 22, 1996).
Durational limits set caps on the number of days of inpatient hospitalization or outpatient
treatment that a given plan will cover. Many plans impose no limits on the number of inpatient
days allowed for physical care, while limiting inpatient days for mental health care to between
thirty and sixty per year. Youndy C. Cook, Comment, Messing With Our Minds: The Mental
Illness Limitation in Health Insurance, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 345, 345 n.2 (1996). Coinsurance
and copayments refer to the percentage amount of costs or the set dollar amount that must be
paid by the insurance beneficiary for each visit.
14. According to a 1989 survey, 87% of employers providing health benefit plans imposed
a limitation on inpatient mental health care. Survey, Response Highlight Managed-Care
Controversy; Limitations on Treatment for Substance Abuse and Mental Disorders, 3 Alcoholism
& Drug Abuse Week 3, 4 (Jan. 30, 1991) ('Survey"). This figure represented a 12% increase in
the use of these limitations since 1988. Id.
15. Ridgely and Goldman, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 428 (cited in note 9) (noting that "the
concept of 'parity' has been a rallying cry for advocates of more comprehensive" mental health
care benefits).
16. See generally Rubenstein, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 315 (cited in note 13); Cook, 50 U.
Miami L. Rev. at 345 (cited in note 13); Brian D. Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick Too-The Case
for Equal Insurance Coverage for Serious Mental Illness, 24 St. Mary's L. J. 365 (1993); Wayne
E. Ramage, Note, The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for Mental Health Care, 45 Vand. L.
Rev. 951 (1992); Rubin, 28 Houston L. Rev. at 143 (cited in note 1).
17. Senator Domenici has repeatedly introduced parity proposals in Congress. See notes
19 and 170 (citing to two such Domenici proposals).
18. See note 13 (discussing these limitations). While these limits seem to be the primary
policy focus, commentators urge for a broader notion of "parity." See Rubenstein, 40 St. Louis
U. L. J. at 323 (cited in note 13) (adding access to a broader range of services to the notion of
parity); Ridgely and Goldman, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 428 (cited in note 9) (stressing the need
for overall "fairness" in benefits decisions as opposed to identical benefits).
MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT
Attention to parity, however, did not translate into success for
mental health advocates. Early congressional parity proposals met
with defeat,19 and President Clinton's plan for universal coverage,
which included substantial, though limited mental health benefits, 0
failed. Furthermore, although Congress finally enacted the Mental
Health Parity Act of 1996 ("MHPA")1 it was not the sweeping victory
for mental health advocates that its title suggests. While signaling a
possible first step in the right direction, the MHPA only restricts the
use of unequal annual and lifetime monetary caps on mental health
services, leaving other important limitations untouched and setting
no federally-mandated minimum benefit levels.22 This Note argues, in
part, that the MHPA is a common phenomenon in health care
legislation: broad, idealistic access goals severely undercut by cost
containment concerns. 23 In the MHPA, this phenomenon is evidenced
by the substantial difference between the original broad parity
proposal that was defeated and the narrow provision finally enacted.
The provisions in the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA")2 4 regarding insurance and benefit plans25 appear to be part of
the same legislative trend. Rather than explicitly and clearly
addressing these cost containment concerns to protect those with
mental disabilities, Congress created a confusing statutory provision
that potentially affords no protection against "discriminatory"
limitations and reductions. Nonetheless, the EEOC's interpretation
of the ADA and recent judicial decisions suggest that various
insurance practices may face scrutiny under the ADA.
19. Senator Domenici first introduced parity-type legislation in 1992. See "Equitable
Health Care for Severe Mental Illnesses Act of 1992," S. 2696, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. (May 12,
1992), in 138 Cong. Rec. S6490 (May 12, 1992). The bill, however, never became law.
20. Initially, the Clinton plan would have covered fewer days for both inpatient and outpa-
tient care of mental illness than for general medical care. Clinton Plan Includes Mental Health
Benefits-But Are They Enough?, 68 Hospitals & Health Networks 46, 46 (1994). The goal,
however, was to reach full parity for mental health benefits by the year 2001. Id. See also
Ridgely and Goldman, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 425-27 (cited in note 9) (discussing the important
victories for mental health advocates during President Clinton's attempts at health care re-
form).
21. Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996).
22. Most importantly, the MHPA does not restrict the use of unequal durational limits or
coinsurance rates. MHPA § 712(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 2946.
23. One commentator has termed this phenomenon "legislative schizophrenia." James F.
Blumstein, Court Action, Agency Reaction: The Hill-Burton Act as a Case Study, 69 Iowa L.
Rev. 1227, 1227 (1984). For a full discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the MHPA
and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), see Part IV.A.
24. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat 327, codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1994 ed.).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
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This Note analyzes the federal protections (or lack thereof
extended to private mental health insurance benefits-in particular
those provided through employment-based plans-under the MHPA
and the ADA. Part II discusses the competing views and provisions of
the MHPA and the limited impact it is likely to have on the ability of
those suffering from mental illness to secure private insurance
benefits. Part III attempts to determine whether the ADA provides
any protection for persons with mental disabilities seeking to secure
access to private insurance funds and concludes that the ADA is not a
viable source of relief. Part IV discusses the legislative parallels
between the MHPA and the ADA and the future implications of these
parallels. Part IV also analyzes potential legislative compromises
that would provide persons with mental illness greater access to
private health insurance funds, while stopping short of providing
complete parity of insurance for mental and physical illness. Part IV
concludes with a brief discussion of managed mental health care28 and
the additional parity issues it raises.
II. THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT OF 1996
A. The Competing Views
1. Justifications for Mental Health Limitations
Insurers and employers stress cost containment as the primary
justification for mental illness limitations.27  There are several
26. For the purposes of this Note, the terms "managed mental health care" and "managed
care" refer to health plans that use various forms of utilization review to monitor the delivery of
care as a means of controlling costs. Rubin, 28 Houston L. Rev. at 161 (cited in note 1). This
approach to health insurance differs from the traditional fee-for-service approach, in which
providers determine the necessary care, and attendant costs are reimbursed by insurance
companies without any review of the provider's decision or the necessity of care. Marc A.
Rodwin, Managed Care and Consumer Protection. What Are the Issues?, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev.
1007, 1009 n.1 (1996).
27. Insurers seek to contain costs through risk classification. On the individual level, the
insurers try to measure the burden that a policyholder will place on the insurance pool and then
charge premiums that reflect that burden. Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too
Important to Be Left to the Actuaries, 19 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 349, 361 (1986) (describing the "fair
discrimination" perspective of classification). In the group underwriting setting, low-risk enrol-
lees and high-risk enrollees offset one another. H. Miriam Farber, Note, Subterfuge Do
Coverage Limitations and Exclusions in Employer-Provided Health Care Plans Violate the
Americans with Disabilities Act?, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 850, 866 (1994). In such plans, rather than
individually charging particular enrollees higher premiums and then providing the same
758 [Vol. 50:753
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dimensions to this cost argument. First, employers argue that
limiting services, such as those related to mental healthcare, is nec-
essary to guarantee access to health care to a greater number of peo-
ple. Parity, they contend, could eliminate some individuals from
existing programs by causing an increase in rates or by causing
employers to drop coverage altogether.
Insurers also offer two other cost arguments against parity:
moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard posits that
demand for services increases when insurance covers the services. 2
8
In the case of mental illness, this concern is heightened because
individuals "might claim to suffer from an illness when they are
actually suffering from life."29 In addition, clinicians can find ways to
avoid insurance restrictions.30 The premise underlying this view, and
insurers' view of mental health care in general, is that diagnosis and
treatment of mental health disorders is more uncertain and less
effective than diagnosis and treatment in other areas in medicine. 31
benefits to all employees at the same cost, employers commonly contain costs by imposing
across-the-board limitations, such as a mental illness coverage limitation. Id. at 867 n.99.
28. See David Mechanic, Mental Health Services in the Context of Health Insurance
Reform, 71 Milbank Q. 349, 352-53 (1993). Mechanic explains:
Economists focus on "moral hazard," which is an inclination to use services more when
they are fully insured in contrast to use under varying copayment arrangments. Use of
outpatient mental health services is more responsive to price than is use of general
medical services, leading to the belief that cost barriers are more necessary in the pro-
vision of these services.
Id. (citations omitted).
29. James E. Sabin and Norman Daniels, Determining 'Medical Necessity" in Mental
Health Practice, 24 Hastings Center Rep. 5, 9-10 (Nov./Dec. 1994).
30. Id. at 12 ("Insurance administrators are acutely aware that clinicians can always find
ways to circumvent insurance restrictions."). This assertion has some empirical basis. See id.
(reporting a poll in which 68% of physicians admitted their willingness to deceive third-party
payers when they believe coverage to be unfair). See Richard E. Vatz and Lee S. Weinberg, We
Should Avoid Mental Health Insurance, U.S.A. Today (Magazine) 34, 34 (Nov. 1994) (reporting a
television investigation revealing a scandal in which psychiatric hospitals falsely diagnosed
patients as having severe mental illness for insurance purposes).
31. See John KL Iglehart, Managed Care and Mental Health, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 131,
131-135 (1996) ('CThe nature of mental illness-its less well-defined boundaries and the greater
uncertainty of clinical diagnosis and treatment-has left most payers unwilling to provide
unlimited coverage."). Sabin and Daniels, 24 Hastings Center Rep. at 5 (cited in note 29)
('Many insurance administrators believe that judgments about medical necessity [i.e.,
appropriateness of treatment] in mental health are less precise than similar judgments in other
areas of medicine."). This issue causes a considerable divergence of opinions. Some
commentators apparently assume the view of insurers to be true. See Mechanic, 71 Milbank Q.
at 354 (cited in note 28) (noting that "standards for psychiatric inpatient care are less clear than
for medical and surgical care, and... psychiatric diagnosis is a particularly poor indicator of
resource need or use."). Others challenge the validity of this notion, especially in the context of
serious mental illness. See Shannon, 24 St. Mary's L. J. at 369 (cited in note 16) (discussing the
efficacy of treatment for several mental illnesses). Regardless, disagreement does seem to exist
among mental health professionals concerning the proper treatment and outcome in mental
health care, Petrila, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 391 (cited in note 1), and there is relatively little
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The economic justification for not providing care that is subject to
moral hazard is that such care is not truly worth its price;
beneficiaries would not have sought the care if they had to pay the
entire cost themselves.
32
The second argument regarding cost is adverse selection. Both
employers and insurers fear that offering mental health coverage will
attract a large number of high risk enrollees, since most plans lack
such coverage. 33 The increased number of high risk enrollees raises
costs and again forces either a reduction in coverage or an increase in
premiums.
Employers and insurers also invoke the safety net of public
services as a justification for mental illness limitations. Though
limitations may lead to the exhaustion of benefits by the severely ill,
state mental health systems provide a form of catastrophic coverage,
relieving the insurer of ultimate responsibility for the insured's
costs.
3 4
The business community naturally supports allowing market
forces to determine the coverage of mental health benefits, presum-
ably confident that the market can best allocate the scarce resources
available for health care. Employers cite to the fact that overall
enrollee interest in mental health benefits is low compared to that of
proof of the effectiveness of treatment for mental illness. Philip Boyle, Managed Care in Mental
Health: A Cure or a Cure Worse Than the Disease? 40 St. Louis U. L. J. 437, 440 (1996)
(suggesting at least some recognizable difference exists between the two kinds of care).
The question remains, however, whether this difference warrants a lower level of coverage
for mental illness, especially when the suffering of those with mental illness arguably is no less
than those with physical illness. Many who defend unequal treatment argue that those with
mental illness have either caused their own problems or are hopelessly incurable, therefore
deserving fewer benefits. See Boyle, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 440. Advocates, however, consider
this point of view "overstated", id., and stress that some mental illnesses are treatable.
Shannon, 24 St. Mary's L. J. at 369 (cited in note 16).
32. Frank and McGuire, 9 Health Affairs at 41 n.10 (cited in note 10).
33. The fact that a large percentage of the cost associated with mental health services is
comprised of expenditures on a few severely ill patients further bolsters this fear. See Donald
M. Steinwachs, Judith D. Kasper, and Elizabeth A. Skinner, Patterns of Use and Costs Among
Severely Mentally Ill People, 9 Health Affairs 178, 178 (Fall 1992) ("Although individuals with
severe mental illness represent a small proportion (5-10 percent) of all individuals having a
mental illness, it is estimated that they account for approximately 40 percent of specialty care
expenditures and probably about the same proportion of total expenditures") (footnote omitted).
States have mandated minimum mental health benefits as a means of combatting the
effects of adverse selection. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 729-
31 (1984) (outlining the rationale behind Massachusetts's minimum mental health benefits
mandates). Adverse selection, for example, drives up the cost of a particular plan for
individuals who would otherwise buy mental health insurance. Id. at 731. Minimum mandates
can combat this result by "effectively forcing the good-risk individuals to become part of the risk
pool, and enabling insurers to price the insurance at an average market rather than a market
retracted due to adverse selection." Id.
34. Frank and McGuire, 9 Health Affairs at 35 (cited in note 10).
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other services and to interest in maintaining lower premiums. 35  In
short, employers argue that fewer restrictions on the ability to tailor
health plans, including a freedom from parity requirements, would
allow for better total cost control, benefiting the entire health care
system and fulfilling consumer desires. 36
2. The Case for Mental Health Parity
Mental health advocates refer to mental health limitations as
"the last bastion of open discrimination in health insurance in this
country."37 They argue that public and political biases and the stigma
attached to those with mental illness are the primary sources of men-
tal health coverage limitations.38 This argument can be used to
undermine many of the arguments in favor of the limitations. Bias
could be present in the insurer's view of the clinical uncertainty of
35. See id. at 35-36 (listing lack of enrollee interest as a reason for the prevalence of
limited mental health coverage). Note, however, that Frank and McGuire attribute this lack of
interest to "denial, underestimation of the effectiveness of mental health services, stigma
associated with mental illness, or undervaluing benefits of service use that may accrue to wider
populations." Id. As a result, they suggest that regulation of mental health coverage may be
justified. Id. at 36.
One should also note that this lack of enrollee interest does not alleviate the insurer's
adverse selection fear that high-cost enrollees who represent a small percentage of the overall
enrollees to health plans-namely the severely mentally ill-will choose an insurance plan
based on the availability of mental health coverage.
36. See Susan Nanovich Flannery, Employer Health-Care Plans: The Feasibility of
Disability-Based Distinctions Under ERISA and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 12 Hofstra
Labor L. J. 211, 248 (1995) (suggesting that perhaps if ERISA governed without the interference
of state insurance regulations, employers could manage their benefit plans in the most efficient
manner).
37. CBO Analysis Doesn't Tell Full Story on Mental Health Parity, Coalition Says, 4
Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) 908 (May 27, 1996) (quoting a press release by the Coalition for
Fairness in Mental Illness Coverage).
38. From a historical perspective, the mentally ill have tradionally received substandard
treatment in Anglo-American society. See Ramage, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 951 (cited in note 16)
(noting that in England, inmates of Bedlam Prison, a famous insane asylum, were exhibited to
the public for a fee). A lack of funding for treatment and care and for the education of the public
keeps both scientific and societal knowledge of their plight at a minimum. See, Orentlicher, 31
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 51 (cited in note 4) (stating that "the stigma of psychiatric illness has
led researchers and funders of research to neglect psychiatric illness when developing treat-
ments for disease"). Under this view, insurance limitations become direct evidence of the
intentional and structural bias against the mentally ill.
Though this bias certainly exists to some extent, the political support given and the lip
service paid to the parity issue belies the notion that some kind of outdated prejudice against
those with mental illness is the sole barrier to reaching parity. The expansion of mental health
benefits in the early 1980s followed by cutbacks over the subsequent years suggests that cost
concerns, not bias, are the real root of these limitations. See Gloria Ruby, The Policy
Implications of Insurance Coverage for Psychiatric Services, 7 Inl J. L. & Psych. 269, 271 (1984)
(attributing the expansion of mental health services to, among other things, "public acceptance
of psychiatric treatment").
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mental health, while the stigma attached to receiving treatment for
mental illness could also explain the low demand for mental health
coverage from consumers. 39  In addition, bias results in
undereducation regarding mental health. This lack of education
undermines the market choice solution advocated by insurers, since
consumers with incomplete or biased information are incapable of
making fully informed decisions necessary for the proper functioning
of the marketplace. Finally, bias eliminates the moral hazard
argument because an uninformed and fearful public4° will not actively
seek mental health services.
41
As a corollary to the bias argument, commentators have ar-
gued that no sound biological basis for the differential treatment of
certain psychological disorders and physical disorders exists. 42  Legal
39. See Ramage, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 972-75 (cited in note 16) (discussing the role that the
stigma attached to mental illness has played in the undervaluing of mental health care by
society as a whole).
40. For a study of public perceptions of mental illness, see generally Andrew B.
Borenstein, Public Attitudes Toward Persons with Mental Illness, 11 Health Affairs 186 (Fall
1992). In particular, Borenstein notes that the stigma associated with seeing a psychiatrist has
lessened over the last two decades. Id. at 187. However, a vast majority of Americans reported
that they were not well-informed about mental illness. Id. at 188-89.
41. Studies have estimated that 15% of the population has a mental disorder, but only one
quarter of these individuals seek treatment. McGuire, 72 Milbank Q. at 3 (cited in note 10).
42. Ridgely and Goldman, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 415-16 (cited in note 9). Scientific
research has shown that several severe psychological disorders are actually due to chemical
imbalances in the brain. Shannon, 24 St. Mary's L. J. at 367-70 (cited in note 16). These
disorders include schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depressive illness. Id. at 367. In
addition, studies have demonstrated the efficacy of treatment for these disorders. Id. at 369. As
a result, some argue, they should be treated like any other brain disorder such as Alzheimer's
disease. Id. Although "behavioral disorders" and "physical diseases" are both classified under
the label "mental illness," Shannon draws a sharp distinction between the two. Id. at 372-74
(arguing that "[p]olicy limitations or other cost controls may be entirely appropriate for purely
behavioral or emotional problems"). But see M. Gregg Bloche and Francine Cournos, Mental
Health Policy for the 1990s: Tinkering in the Interstices, 15 J. of Health Politics, Policy & L.
387, 399 (1990) (referring to the depiction of mental illness as "an exclusively biological
problem" as a "caricature"). The danger of the purely biological approach is the creation of
sharp distinctions regarding not only the origin of the illness, but also the type of care given. Id.
For example, those individuals suffering from a biological illness, such as schizophrenia, require
care that closely resembles the care required for exclusively emotional or stress-related
problems. See id. (stressing the need for non-biological interventions for the treatment of
schizophrenia). The problem with these origin-based arguments is that insurers are not really
concerned about the etiology of the disorders, but rather the cost, effectiveness, and certainty
involved in their treatment and diagnosis. While treatment for biologically-based mental
disorders may be effective, it is still a complex and long-term solution. Bloche and Cournos, 15
J. of Health Pol., Policy & L. at 399 (cited in this note) (stressing the need for "[p]sychotherapy,
family education, occupational and social rehabilitation, and other psychosocial interventions"
in addition to biological interventions for effective treatment of schizophrenia). However,
treatment for severe mental illness is as effective as treatment for some physical illnesses, such
as heart disease. When introducing his proposal, Senator Domenici stated, "Treatment for
schizophrenia has a 60 percent success rate; manic depression, 80 percent; major depression, 65
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commentators have criticized the limitations because of judicial
uncertainty generated by challenges to the denial of benefits. 43 They
argue that the conflicting approaches the courts use to determine
whether certain illnesses are "mental" or "physical" result in
inequities and shed light on the inconsistencies and unfairness
inherent in the limitations.44
Individuals in favor of parity also argue the offset costs inher-
ent in providing mental health coverage would lead to an overall
reduction in health care and social costs. 45 The warring factions in
recent debates over parity, however, disagreed over the projected
costs of parity. Not surprisingly, the business community studies
revealed large premium increases and cutbacks in other areas of
coverage, while mental health advocate studies showed far lower
overall costs. 46 The Congressional Budget Office also conducted a
study, which concluded that the costs of parity would be substantial,
but not necessarily overwhelming. 47 Ultimately, these studies showed
percent. Yet commonly reimbursed procedures such as angioplasty and arthrectomy have only
a 41 percent and a 52 percent ratio...." 142 Cong. Rec. S3591 (Apr. 18, 1996).
43. See note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the diverse judicial approaches to these
challenges).
44. Cook, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. at 360 (cited in note 13) (The only distinction at this point
seems to be between one group of insureds whose illnesses manifest themselves in socially
stigmatized ways and another group of insureds whose illnesses are more acceptable as physical
injury or disease").
45. See Denis J. Prager and Leslie J. Scallet, Promoting and Sustaining the Health of the
Mind, 11 Health Affairs 118, 120 (Fall 1992) (attributing psychological factors to backaches and
cancer and stating that studies are beginning to show "the role of mental state in the mainte-
nance and deterioration of good physical health and in the treatment of and recovery from
physical illness" (citations omitted)). Empirical evidence supports this assertion. A recent study
determined that middle-aged adults suffering from depression or anxiety were twice as likely to
develop hypertension as those who were calm and happy. Marilyn Elias, High Blood Pressure
Signals: Depression and Anxiety Are Keys, U.S.A. Today D1 (Jan. 28, 1997).
Crime, suicide, homelessness, and lost productivity are also linked to mental illness.
Ramage, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 953-55 (cited in note 16). The percentage of the homeless popula-
tion suffering from a mental disorder is estimated as being between 28% and 56%. Id. But see
Bloche and Cournos, 15 J. of Health Politics, Policy & L. at 389 (cited in note 42) (arguing that
"it is plainly wrong to con(lude, as some mental health professionals have, that the problem of
homelessness is largely a consequence of inadequately treated psychiatric illness" (citations
omitted)). According to some estimates, the costs of depression to employers are $44 billion a
year, "55 percent of that attibuted to absenteeism, lowered productivity, and other factors that
are difficult to measure." Janet Gemignani, Mental Health Matters, 14 Bus. & Health 66, 66
(Sept. 1996).
46. One such study sponsored by business groups found that premiums would increase by
8.3% to 11.4%, while a study sponsored by mental health advocates showed monthly premium
increases of 2.5%. Actuarial Reports Make Case for Parity in Insurance Reform, 8 Alcoholism
and Drug Abuse Week 1, 1 (April 22, 1996).
47. According to the CBO study, 800,000 workers and dependents potentially would lose
employment-based coverage and employer-sponsored health insurance premiums would
increase by 4%. CBO Estimates Mental Health Parity Could Leave 400,000 Workers Uncovered,
4 Health Care Policy Rep (BNA) 874 (1996).
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the impossibility of agreeably predicting the economic impact that
parity would have.
Parity proponents also argue that private insurance for mental
illness is necessary to relieve taxpayers and underfunded state
programs from the burden of providing mental health insurance.48
Insurers, however, rely on the public safety net to care for those
individuals requiring extraordinary amounts of care. Unfortunately,
this "net" may not even exist for some individuals. 49
In short, mental health advocates conclude that mental illness
coverage limitations are arbitrary and without sound basis.50 Their
argument for parity is a powerful moral and ethical imperative, and,
were it not for economic costs, would be absolutely persuasive.
Although proponents argue that costs should not be the decisive
factor, Congress, as illustrated by the MHPA, apparently does not
agree.
B. Background and Substance of the Mental Health Parity Act
1. Legal Background
States had already taken an active regulatory role in the
regulation of mental health insurance before the MHPA. In 1989,
thirty-eight states had some form of mandatory mental health bene-
fits laws 5l and, by 1996, seven had enacted parity-type legislation.52
48. See generally Bloche and Cournos, 15 J. of Health Politics, Policy, & L. at 387 (cited in
note 42).
49. Ramage, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 972 (cited in note 16).
50. The sentiment of many mental health advocates is that these kinds of cost-
containment devices simply do not effectively ration care. See 142 Cong. Rec. S3591 (April 18,
1996) (statement of Senator Domenici) (stating that "artificial costs measures to reduce
utilization are a thing of the pase'); Orentlicher, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 85 (cited in note
4) (arguing that flat caps that ration health care according to type of service should play a
limited role under the ADA and in health care generally).
51. Mary Jane England, Mental Health Care" Buyers Take the Lead, 9 Bus. & Health 58,
58 (Jan. 1991). These mandates generally take two forms. One requires that plan enrollees
have mental health coverage, while the other requires employers and insurers to offer the
option of mental health coverage. David A- Lambert and Thomas G. McGuire, Political and
Economic Determinants of Insurance Regulation in Mental Health, 15 J. of Health Politics,
Policy & L. 169, 170-71 (1990). See, for example, Or. Rev. Stat. § 743.556(6) (1996 Supp.)
(requiring a minimum level of benefits for mental illness and substance abuse of no less than
$10,500 for adults); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 632.89(2) (West, 1995) (requiring minimum day limits for
inpatient and outpatient mental health and substance abuse treatment). The Supreme Court
stated that one such statute was:
intended to help safeguard the public against the high costs of comprehensive inpatient
and outpatient mental-health care, reduce nonpsychiatric medical-care expenditures for
mentally related illness, shift delivery of treatment from inpatient to outpatient
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Many of these state mandates, however, proved ineffective for secur-
ing adequate benefits. 3
The judiciary had also confronted cases concerning mental
health coverage limitations prior to enactment of the MHPA.M In
these cases, plaintiffs challenged limitations on insurance benefits for
their biologically-based "mental" conditions by invoking the more
generous standards applicable to "physical" illness.55  These
services, and relieve the [state] of some of the financial burden it otherwise would
encounter with respect to mental-health problems.
Metropolitan Life Ins.,, 471 U.S. at 731 (citation omitted) (discussing Massachusetts' statute).
52. These states are Maryland, Minnesota, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, North
Carolina and Texas. Mental Health Parity Laws Enacted in Seven States, Others Study Impact,
5 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1739 (Dec. 5, 1996). See, for example, 24-A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4234-
A(6)-(7) (1996 Supp.) (requiring parity in group and individual insurance contracts for a certain
number of severe mental illnesses); Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, § 490V(b)(1) (Michie, 1994) ("[E]ach
contract or policy of health insurance may not discriminate against any person with a mental
illness, emotional disorder or a drug abuse or alcohol abuse disorder by failing to provide
benefits for ... these illnesses under the same terms and conditions that apply . .. for treatment
of physical illness."); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 415:18-a(I) (Equity, 1991 & 1996 Supp.) (requiring
that mental health benefits be as favorable as certain other minimum benefits); R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 27-38.2-1 (1994) (requiring parity in coverage for "serious mental illness"); Tex. Ins. Code Ann.
§ 3.51-14 (Vernon 1997 Supp.) (listing five disorders or groups of disorders that qualify as
"serious mental illnesses' that are to receive parity of coverage).
53. England, 9 Bus. & Health at 58 (cited in note 51).
54. For a fuller discussion of these cases and the relevant issues, see generally Cook, 50 U.
Miami L. Rev. at 345 (cited in note 13); Shannon, 24 St. Mary's L. J. at 375-86 (cited in note 16);
Ramage, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 963-68 (cited in note 16).
55. In response, the judicary developed three primary approaches:
symptom/manifestation, causation, and treatment. Cook, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. at 348-49 (cited
in note 13). But see Klebe v. ITRE Group Health Care Plan, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 17696, *5
(4th Cir. July 19, 1996) (concluding, without attempting to apply one of the three tests, that the
term "mental health treatmenf' was unambiguous within the context of defendant's health care
plan and "that treatment for chronic schizophrenia clearly falls under that umbrella").
Under the symptom/manifestation approach, courts look only at the outward manifestations
of the illness to determine which insurance category to apply. Cook, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. at 348
(cited in note 13). See Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Berry, 260 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989), in which the court sustained the denial of disability benefits to a manic depressive
pursuant to a mental illness limitation. Though expert testimony claimed manic depression had
an organic cause, the court stated "[m]anifestation, not cause, is the yardstick." Id. at 824
(footnote omitted). See also Brewer v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.
1990) (concluding that affective mood disorder fell under a mental illness limitation because a
layperson would consider behavioral manifestations as determinative for purposes of insurance
classification). Invariably, courts applying the symptom/manifestation approach ruled in favor
of the insurance companies.
In contrast, courts applying the causation approach looked to the origin of the illness and
were more likely to allow plaintiffs the greater "physical" illness benefits. Cook, 50 U. Miami L.
Rev. at 358 (cited in note 13). See, for example, Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 696 F.
Supp. 1342, 1346 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (defining mental illness as a "behavioral disturbance with no
demonstrable organic or physical causes"). These outcomes resulted from the courts'
willingness to entertain expert testimony that certain mental illnesses were organic in origin.
Cook, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. at 358 (cited in note 13).
Finally, under the treatment approach, courts consider whether the type of care given is
"psychiatri' or "medical" in nature in determining the extent of policy coverage. Id. at 353-54.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:753
challenges, however, met with inconsistent results and limited long-
term success because insurers could adjust their policy language to
preclude judicial intervention.56 Mental health advocates thus saw
the MHPA as long overdue.
The federal government regulates employer-provided benefit
plans through the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"). 57 Although the pre-MHPA ERISA contained a non-
discrimination provision, 58 the scope of this provision did not reach
benefit limitations. 59  As a result, advocates called for parity
legislation addressing these concerns.
In 1996, many attempts at passing parity legislation were
based on expansive notions of equality and called for a broad parity
mandate requiring employers and insurers to impose only those
financial limitations on mental health care that they imposed upon
coverage for other conditions.6 To the surprise of many, one such
proposal by Senators Domenici and Wellstone passed the Senate by a
vote of sixty-eight to thirty.61 The Domenici-Wellstone proposal would
have eliminated differential treatment of mental health conditions
with regard to annual and lifetime dollar caps, inpatient and
Courts primarily used this approach in instances in which the insurance plan limits the type of
care or treatment that can be provided. Id.
56. Id. at 359.
57. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1994) ("ERISA").
For a full discussion of the treatment of employee health plans under ERISA, see Flannery, 12
Hofstra Labor L. J. at 213-27 (cited in note 36).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 ('It shall be unlawful for any person to... discriminate against a
participant or beneficiary... for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to
which such participant may become entitled under [an employee benefit] plan").
59. In McGann v. H. & H. Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), the court specifically
held that an employer's reduction in benefits under ERISA for Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome ("AIDS") did not discriminate against an employee suffering from that disease. Id. at
408. The broader and more significant holdings were that ERISA did not require employers to
provide any particular benefits and that employers had the absolute right to determine the
terms of their benefit plans. Id. at 406-07.
60. For example, a bill sponsored by Senators Domenici and Wellstone stated:
PROHIBITION.-An employee health benefit plan, or a health plan issuer offering a
group health plan or an individual health plan, shall not impose treatment limitations
or financial requirements on the coverage of mental health services if similar limitations
or requirements are not imposed on coverage for services for other conditions.
S. 1028, § 305(a), 104th Cong., 2d. Sess. (April 18, 1996), in 142 Cong. Rec. 83670 (Apr 18, 1996).
A later proposal, introduced by Representative Pete Stark, amended the Internal Revenue
Code to impose a 25% tax on the premiums received by an insurer who imposed "limitations or
financial requirements" on the coverage of mental illness, unless similar limitations were
imposed on other covered conditions. 142 Cong. Rec. E1551-52 (Sept. 10, 1996) (summarizing
the National Mental Health Improvement Acts of 1996, H.R. 4045, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1996)).
61. Specifically, a motion to table the amendment was rejected by the sixty-eight to thirty
vote, and the bill was subsequently adopted by voice vote. 54 Cong. Q 1077 (1996).
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outpatient hospitalization limits, and coinsurance rates.62  The
proposal would not, however, have affected the use of preadmission
screening or the limitation of coverage to "medically necessary"
services.
61
The business community strongly opposed the Domenici-
Wellstone bill. Lobbyists produced studies claiming to show that the
proposal would have a devastating effect on premiums and the num-
ber of Americans receiving health insurance coverage. 64 Moreover,
despite Senate approval, individual Senators did not appear to fully
support the bill. For example, Senator Robert Dole, shortly after
affirmatively voting for the bill, stated "[t]hat's a very, very expensive
provision, and it's going to cause all kinds of problems.."65 The bill
ultimately succumbed to such opposition in the conference committee
for the Health Insurance Portability and Affordability Act.66
Senators Domenici and Wellstone, however, had not given up
their effort to push parity legislation through Congress in 1996. In a
"last-minute maneuver," the senators successfully attached a more
limited piece of parity legislation, the current MHPA, to the VA-HUD
Appropriations Bill,67 which passed the Senate.68 Despite opposition
from employer groups, President Clinton signed the bill on September
26, 1996.69
2. The Legislative "Compromise": What Does the Act Accomplish?
Compared to the broad scope of the original proposal, the
MHPA accomplishes very little. It only requires parity for lifetime
62. S. 1028, § 305(b), 104th Cong., 2d. Sess. (Apr. 18, 1996), in 142 Cong. Rec. S3670 (Apr.
18, 1996).
63. Id. Had the bill passed, the exemption of these practices would have been crucial to its
effect on managed care. See Part IV.B.3 (discussing the use of "medical necessity" in managed
care).
64. See Employer Groups' Study Bolsters Claims of Negative Side of Mental Health Parity,
4 Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) 995, 995 (June 10, 1996) (reporting a study that estimated the
parity bill would cause a $20 billion reduction in federal revenues, a loss of employer-sponsored
insurance by 1.7 million workers and their dependents, and an 8.7% average increase in private
health insurance premiums).
65. Senate Passes Kassebaum-Kennedy Bill, Setting Stage for Conference with House, 5
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 629 (Apr. 25, 1996).
66. Steve Langdon, Kennedy, Kassebaum Steer Insurance Bill to Safety, 54 Cong. Q. 2197,
2197 (1996).
67. David Nather, Insurance Regulation: Senate Attaches Maternity Stay, Mental Health
Amendments to VA-HUD Bill, 4 Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) 1417, 1417-18 (Sept. 9, 1996).
68. The provision passed by an eighty-two to fifteen vote. 54 Cong. Q. 2555 (1996).
69. Jon Healey, VA-HUD Spending Bill Clears With Bipartisan Support, 54 Cong. Q.
2762, 2762 (Oct. 4, 1996).
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and annual limitations on benefits.7 If a plan imposes no such mone-
tary limits on "substantially all medical and surgical benefits," then
the plan may not so limit mental health benefits. 71 If a plan does limit
medical and surgical benefits, then the plan may either include men-
tal health benefits under the category of medical and surgical benefits
or treat mental health benefits as a separate category capped at an
amount no less than that applicable to medical and surgical benefits. 72
The Act specifically excludes cost sharing or coinsurance, day limits,
and medical necessity requirements from its reach.73
Though the limited nature of the MHPA ensures that employ-
ers will not simply stop offering health benefit plans, employers
whose current plans utilize annual and lifetime caps may be ex-
empted from the Act, or, in the alternative, choose from several op-
tions for maintaining cost controls on mental health benefits. The
bottom line is that the Act does not require employers to include
mental health benefits in its plans, nor does it require a plan option
that includes mental health coverage. 74 Thus, the Act seems to pun-
ish those employers who do provide these benefits, while employers
that refuse to provide benefits altogether receive no extra burden.
In addition, because the Act leaves employers free to use day
limits and coinsurance rates without parity, cost-conscious employers
will likely find a way to keep mental health costs at current levels.75
For instance, employers using both a dollar and a day limit could
resort to further minimizing the number of days allowed under a plan
or could impose an exorbitantly high coinsurance rate.
While the original Domenici-Wellstone proposal would have
required parity of benefits for all employers and insurance plans, the
MHPA applies only to large and mid-sized employers. 7r Congress
inserted this provision to placate fears that small employers faced
with increased costs from one or two chronic users of mental health
services would drop their benefit plans altogether. Of course, this
concern ignores the simple fact that small employers could either opt
out of mental health coverage altogether or use other types of
70. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, § 712(a), Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2945 (1996).
71. MliPA § 712(a)(1)(A), (2)(A), 110 Stat. at 2945.
72. MHPA § 712(a)(1)(B),(2)(B), 110 Stat. at 2945.
73. MHPA § 712(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 2946.
74. MHPA § 712(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 2946.
75. Employers who currently use annual or lifetime monetary caps have plenty of time to
plan around the Act, which does not become effective until January 1, 1998. MHPA § 712(c)(2),
110 Stat. at 2947.
76. Employers with fewer than fifty employees are automatically exempted. MHPA §
712(c)(1), 110 Stat. at 2946.
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limitations. The Act also exempts employers who incur a one percent
increase in the cost of their plan177 as a result of complying with the
statute. 78 Finally, the Act allows for employer cost containment by
giving employers the authority to define what constitutes "mental
health benefits."
79
One could argue that the MHPA begins in the right place.
Annual and lifetime caps are the most commonly used mental illness
coverage limitation in traditional indemnity or fee-for-service plans,80
presumably because they give insurers the most absolute cost
protections. Because these caps are the most commonly used
limitations in these types of plans, the MHPA arguably will have a
greater impact than if the Act only eliminated durational limits or
unequal coinsurance rates. Moreover, lifetime caps permanently end
benefits for a small percentage of seriously ill people,sl regardless of
the urgency or need for such services, while effectively subsidizing
less expensive treatment for those with less severe conditions. The
flexibility retained by employers and the emergence of managed care,
however, suggest that the impact of the Act will be negligible.
77. One of the few internal issues regarding the Act is the determination of the one
percent exemption. If employers cannot make this determination prior to the time that the Act
becomes enforceable, they may suffer costs that the Act specifically seeks to avoid. Most likely,
however, employers will have to first remove the caps on mental health care and then calculate
their cost increase. Steve Findlay, Figuring It Out, 14 Bus. & Health 21, 22 (Nov. 1996).
78. MIHIPA § 712(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 2947.
79. MHPA § 712(e)(4), 110 Stat. at 2947. Treatment for alcohol and substance abuse
disorders is automatically exempted from this definition, despite the fact that mental disorders
and substance abuse are oftentimes coexistent. See Ridgely and Goldman, 40 St. Louis U. L. J.
at 426 n.80 (cited in note 9) (reporting a 50% co-morbidity rate between mental illness and
substance abuse). This approach may be something of a step back on the national scene, since
President Clinton's failed attempt at universal coverage would have included coverage of
substance abuse treatment. Id. at 426. This omission, however, could reflect concerns that
substance abuse represents a very large part of the cost increases associated with mental
illness. Shannon, 24 St. Mary's L. J. at 373 n.29 (cited in note 16) (citing substance abuse and
adolescent treatment as the two major areas of escalating costs).
80. One study has shown that 58% of employer plans use maximum lifetime dollar limits,
28% use per year or benefit period dollar limits, 46% use day limits and 35% charge higher
copayments for mental health inpatient care than for general medical treatment. Survey, 3
Alcoholism & Drug Abuse Week at 4 (cited in note 14).
81. See Vicki Baldassano, Mental Health Parity Law May Boost Business for Managed
Care, 4 Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) 1532, 1532 (Sept. 30, 1996) (reporting that 0.1% of
covered patients exceed lifetime limits on mental health coverage).
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C. Implications of the Mental Health Parity Act
1. Modifications to Employee Health Benefit Plans: Accelerating the
Move to Managed Care
Though the MHPA eliminates lifetime and annual caps on
mental health benefits, it does nothing to ensure that employers will
not change their benefit plans to include other caps, such as limits on
inpatient and outpatient days or higher coinsurance rates.
Considering the already tight economic pressures on benefit plans,
employers will most likely make these changes to control mental
health care costs. As a result, the majority of individuals who receive
mental health benefits will likely have to pay higher copayments and
deductibles for their benefits. This policy could actually raise the
overall expenditures of those who use mental health services-a
result presumably in conflict with the goal of parity.
Another possible response by employers that is more favorable
to those with a mental illness would be to lower the dollar caps
applicable to general medical care to offset the increase in mental
health coverage. This result seems unlikely, however, considering the
flexibility provided by the MHPA and the market force of employees
seeking greater health benefits. In other words, rather than shifting
the costs of the Act onto those who could potentially exceed lower
coverage limits on physical health, employers likely will leave the
burden where it currently rests: on the mentally ill.
The prohibition on annual and lifetime caps for mental health
coverage has little effect on managed care. Contrary to traditional
fee-for-service plans, which commonly utilize such monetary caps,
managed care plans primarily combine limits on inpatient and
outpatient days with utilization review to contain the costs of mental
health services.8 2  Compared to the failed Domenici-Wellstone
proposal, which could have ended indemnity-type coverage,83 the
MHPA may only accelerate the move to managed care. The question
82. Id. at 1532. See Jo Brady and John Krizay, Utilization and Coverage of Mental Health
Services in Health Maintenance Organizations, 142 Am. J. Psych. 744, 744 (1985) (reporting
norms of thirty day limits on inpatient coverage, twenty outpatient visits, and copayments as
high as $30 per outpatient visit in a typical health maintenance organization).
83. One study regarding the sweeping parity proposal concluded: "[W]e expect the mental
health parity provision in [the bill] to lead to the end of indemnity-type coverage." Negative
Side of Mental Health Parity, 4 Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) at 996 (cited in note 64) (quoting
a Price Waterhouse study of the Domenici amendment).
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for the mental health community is whether this acceleration is a
move in the right direction.84
2. Policy Implications?
Under the best case scenario for mental health advocates, the
MHPA signifies three things. First, its passage may stimulate public
awareness, dialogue, and, eventually, public support for more expan-
sive legislation. Second, the Act may show that a majority of
Congress is truly concerned about the parity issue and is willing to
dictate that private insurance resources be committed to that end.
Finally, the Act may be an incremental step toward full parity.8 5
More subtly, the enactment may show Congress's desire to
further the move toward managed care in both the public and private
sectors to help relieve budgetary problems.86 This position may be
explained by overriding cost concerns, since managed care has been
effective at containing costs.8 7  This near exclusive focus on costs,
however, gives rise to the question of how committed Congress is to
creating greater access to care for those with mental illness. Though
couched in the rhetoric of antidiscrimination law, the MHPA actually
does little to get to the heart of the "discrimination" it seeks to
remedy. Instead, the MHPA may serve as a salve for the conscience
of legislators who can now feel they have done their part in the fight
for equal insurance benefits for those with mental illness.
84. See Part IV.B.3 (discussing potential advantages and disadvantages of managed
mental health care).
85. Considering the historical role of the state in funding mental health services, however,
it may not be feasible for the private sector immediately to assume care for the most severely ill.
Bernard S. Axons, et al., Mental Health and Substance Abuse Coverage Under Health Reform,
13 Health Affairs 192, 199 (Spring 1994). As a result, incremental change may be the best
approach to easing the private sector into its new financial burdens and could eventually fulfill
the ultimate goals of advocates. See Ridgely and Goldman, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 408 (cited in
note 9) ("History has taught that incremental change.., has succeeded in accomplishing many
of the advocates' goals."). But see Rubin, 28 Houston L. Rev. at 173 (cited in note 1) ("Using the
1990s as a time to make merely incremental changes to the existing collection of public and
private programs may be a mistake").
While further legislation may be a possibility, some political commentators believe, at the
very least, further debate is forthcoming. See Health Insurance Expansion Proposals Could
"Undermine" Employer-Based Health System, According to HLAA's Gradison, 8 Health News
Daily 1 (Nov. 13, 1996) (citing prediction by Bill Gradison, President of the Health Insurance
Association of America, that further efforts toward mental health parity may be forthcoming in
1997).
86. See Iglehart, 334 New Eng. J. Med. at 131 (cited in note 31) (discussing Congress's
desire to reduce spending for mental health care in Medicaid and Medicare and describing
managed care as a "central tenet" of this initiative). Ths use of managed care in public
programs could reduce the cost of such programs through the more efficient use of resources.
87. Id.
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III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND MENTAL HEALTH
BENEFITS
The MHPA forecloses the use of aggregate annual and lifetime
dollar limitations in employee health plans on mental health services.
This Part examines whether the ADA provides any relief for persons
with mental disabilities from the remaining types of mental illness
limitations. Though the answer likely is no, many mental health
advocates have expressed either belief or hope that the ADA could
provide such relief.88
Two major legal obstacles impede the attempts of persons with
mental disabilities who seek greater insurance benefits under the
ADA. The first is a necessary showing that a mental illness
limitation is a "disability-based" distinction warranting scrutiny
under the ADA. 89 The second is the avoidance of the ADA's "safe
88. See Cook, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. at 365-66 (cited in note 13) (suggesting that the ADA
mandate some coverage for those with severe mental illness); Orentlicher, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. at 85 (cited in note 4) (contending that day limitations on mental health treatment could be
prohibited by the ADA under the proposed "destructured disability standard"); Ramage, 45
Vand. L. Rev. at 970-71 (cited in note 16) (arguing that mental illness limitations could be found
to be subterfuges to evade the purposes of the ADA).
89. The EEOC has determined that before a suit against a discriminatory plan can be
brought, the plaintiff must show that the plan uses a "disability-based" distinction. EEOC,
Interim Guidance on Application of ADA to Health Insurance (June 8, 1993), reprinted in F.E.P.
Man. (BNA) 405:7115, 7116 (1993) ("EEOC Guidance"). According to the EEOC, a distinction "is
'disability-based' if it singles out a particular disability..., a discrete group of disabilities ....
or disability in general." Id. at 405:7118.
Conversely, health plan distinctions that are not based on disability and that are applied
equally to employees regardless of disability cannot violate the ADA. Id. at 405:7117. For
example, a mental illness limitation cannot violate the ADA if the distinction applies to a multi-
tude of both disabling and non-disabling conditions and therefore cannot be said to discriminate
on the basis of disability. Id. at 405:7117-18. By contrast, a benefits cap on AIDS treatments
could violate the ADA because the cap only affects those individuals with a disabling illness. Id.
at 405:7118-19. This conclusion potentially would give relief to the plaintiff in McGann, see
note 59, while refusing such relief to the mentally disabled.
As support for its position that mental illness limitations do not violate the ADA as disabil-
ity-based discrimination, the EEOC cites to judicial decisions under the Rehabilitation Act.
EEOC Guidance at 405:7118 n.9 (cited in this note) (citing Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d. Cir.
1979) (upholding a Pennsylvania program limiting care in a private mental hospital to sixty
days) and Doe v. Devine, 545 F.Supp. 576 (D.D.C. 1982) (upholding cutbacks in Blue Cross
mental health benefits for federal employees)).
The D.C. Circuit reaffirmed this outcome under the Rehabilitation Act. Modderno v. King,
82 F.3d 1059, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In addition, the Seventh Circuit has concluded that mental
illness limitations in disability insurance are not discriminatory under the ADA. EEOC v. CNA
Insurance Co., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1996). The D.C. Circuit, however, declined to
answer this question under the ADA when given the opportunity. Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1065
("Whether or not Modderno stated a claim under the 1992 amendment of § 504 apart from the
safe-harbor provision-a question on which we express no opinion-the coverage limitations
challenged by Modderno cannot violate amended § 504").
The problem with the EEOCs view is that it allows employers to discriminate in benefit
plans against persons with mental disabilities, as long as the terms of the plans include both
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harbor" for insurance and employee benefit plans. Under the general
statutory framework of the ADA, a mental illness limitation could
easily violate the ADA. Congress, however, created an apparent safe
harbor, section 501(c),90 which arguably protects all benefit plans from
ADA scrutiny. Congress also inserted language, however, that
creates an exception to the benefit plan exemption, thus possibly
reopening some benefit plans to scrutiny. This Part limits its analysis
to the two primary interpretations of this safe harbor provision and
examines the vulnerability of mental health limitations under each
interpretation.
A. The Broad Goals of the ADA
Congress enacted the ADA as a sweeping mandate to end
discrimination against persons with disabilities 9l in employment,
public services, and public accommodations provided by private
entities.92 The Act provides that no employer s3 "shall discriminate
persons with disabilities and the non-disabled. See Rubenstein, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 353
(cited in note 13) (stating that the EEOC's "analysis... allows the manner in which medical
conditions are grouped for coverage purposes in a health plan to control determinations about
discrimination"). See also Mary T. Giliberti, The Application of the ADA to Distinctions Based
on Mental Disability in Employer-Provided Health and Long-Term Disability Insurance Plans,
18 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rptr. 600, 602 (1994) ("Because of the EEOC's position,
persons with severe disabilities are unable to get care simply because their conditions fall into
the 'mental' category.").
Courts, however, are likely to maintain the logical premise that a distinction between
mental and physical disabilities merely distinguishes between disabilities, not between the
disabled and non-disabled. Antidiscrimination statutes such as the ADA only prohibit the latter
type of discrimination. See Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1062 (concluding that discrimination against
the mentally disabled as compared to the physically disabled was not the purpose of the
Rehabilitation Act).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
91. 42 U.S.C. §12101 (b) states:
It is the purpose of this chapter-
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the
major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
92. Title I of the ADA addresses employement practices, Title II concerns public services,
and Title III addresses public accomodations provided by private entities. See generally 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.
93. The ADA actually uses the broader term of "covered entity" to reach most persons or
organizations involved with employment in any capacity. Id. § 12111(2). An employer is defined
as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
and any agent of such a person ...." Id. § 12111(5).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:753
against a qualified individual with a disability94 ... in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment."9 This broad mandate
includes fringe benefits such as employee health insurance plans.96
Moreover, the ADA explicitly extends to those employment practices
that have a disparate impact on, as well as practices that amount to
disparate treatment of, persons with disabilities.
97
The ADA's definition of disability includes any "physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities."98 More specifically, a mental impairment is defined as
"[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities."9
94. A "qualified individual with a disability" is defined as "an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accomodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individuals holds or desires." Id. § 12111(8). Recent cases
suggest that this term is especially important in the context of disability insurance. See, for
example, CNA Ins., 96 F.3d at 1041-44 (holding that the ADA did not cover the plaintiffs claim
because plaintiff, suffering from severe depression and bipolar illness, was not a "qualified
individual with a disability"). An in-depth discussion of this statutory term is beyond the scope
of this Note.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
96. Id. § 12201(c).
97. Id. § 12112(b). "Disparate treatmene' refers to employment practices that are
intentionally aimed at discriminating on the basis of disability. Rubenstein, 40 St. Louis U. L.
J. at 331 (cited in note 13). 'Disparate impact" refers to employment practices that are facially
neutral toward disability but have a disproportionate effect on the disabled. Id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). In addition, anyone having "a record of such an impairment"
or "regarded as having such an impairment" is considered disabled under the ADA. Id. §
12102(2)(B)-(C). Major life activities include caring for one's self, working, walking, speaking,
learning, and breathing. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1996).
The inclusion of mental disabilities under the ADA was an important victory for the mental
health community. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (excluding transsexualism, sexual behavior disor-
ders, voyeurism, compulsive gambling, and other similar "disorders").
99. EEOC, A Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the
Americans with Disabilities Act 11-2 (1992). This definition tracks the Rehabilitation Act of
1973's use of "handicap," providing a good guidepost as to what disorders qualify under the
ADA. The courts have identified several mental impairments as handicaps under the
Rehabilitation Act. See Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1992) (mental and emotional
illnesses that included severe depression); Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation
Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983) (depressive neurosis); Franklin v. U.S. Postal Service,
687 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (paranoid schizophrenia); Doe v. Syracuse School District,
508 F. Supp. 333 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (nervous breakdown and history of psychological treatment).
See also John F. Fielder, Mental Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Concise
Compliance Manual for Executives 114 (Quorum Books, 1994) (containing a comprehensive
listing of cases that include mental illnesses under the Rehabilitation Aces definition of
"handicap"). In fact, the Senate noted that the definition, with a few limited exceptions, covers
the full range of disorders listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
Harvey S. Mars, An Overview of Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act and Its Impact
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Many insurance practices potentially violate the ADA under
this general framework. Specifically, mental illness limitations that
lack parity are highly suspect. Though such limitations may affect
the disabled and non-disabled alike, they still have a disparate impact
on those with disabling mental illness and therefore possibly violate
the Act.100 Rather than allowing this framework to govern the terms
of health benefit plans, however, Congress created a safe harbor for
many employers otherwise subject to the provisions-section 501(c).
B. The Legislative "Compromise" A Safe Harbor for Insurance and
Employee Health Benefit Plans?'°1
1. Introduction
Though Congress had not dealt with benefit limitations in
ERISA,102 the ADA presented a new opportunity to do so. While per-
sons with disabilities hoped the ADA would open a new line of attack
against health coverage limitations, the insurance industry and
employers hoped to maintain the flexibility that ERISA granted. The
ADA's response to this debate was section 501(c). Section 501(c)
provides:
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and Title IV of this Act shall not be
construed to prohibit or restrict:
(1) an insurer, hospital, or medical service company, health maintenance
organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or
similar organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State
law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing,
sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit
plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
Upon Federal Labor Law, 12 Hofstra Labor L. J. 251, 256 n.26 (1995) (citing 135 Cong. Rec.
S11,173-74 (Sept. 14, 1989)).
100. See Phillip G. Peters, Health Care Rationing and Disability Rights, 70 Ind. L. J. 491,
517 n.127 (1995) (noting that "broad exclusions, like that of mental health, are often closely
related to a large category of disabled persons"); Ramage, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 970 (cited in note
16) ("While ostensibly applying to all employees, such a limitation [on insurance benefits for
mental illnesses] would have a disparate impact on" the mentally-disabled).
101. For the purposes of this Note, analysis of § 501(c) will be primarily limited to Supreme
Court cases involving the ADEA, the EEOC Guidance, and recent case law under the ADA- For
more in depth discussions of cases under the Rehabilitation Act, the Civil Rights Act and
ERISA, see generally Flannery, 12 Hofstra Labor L. J. at 211 (cited in note 36); Farber, 69
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 850 (cited in note 27); Monica E. McFadden, Insurance Benefits Under the
ADA- Discrimination or Business as Usual?, 28 Tort & Insur. L. J. 480 (1993).
102. See notes 58-59 (discussing the scope of ERISA's non-discrimination mandate).
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administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State
law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing,
sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit
plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of subchapter[s] I and III of this chapter.
10 3
At first glance, this provision appears to leave the current
state of employee benefit plans and insurance practices untouched
10 4
so long as they are "bona fide"105 and consistent with state law. It
thus seems to allow employers to avoid the ADA's broad
nondiscrimination requirements. However, the "subterfuge" clause
has generated considerable controversy over the true reach of the
exemption.
While commentators have grappled with the proper interpreta-
tion of section 501(c) for some time, 06 the courts have only recently
begun to evaluate the meaing of the subterfuge provision. Two
primary definitions of "subterfuge" have emerged. The first relies on
the Supreme Court's interpretation of similar language under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").107 The second looks to
the legislative history of the ADA and the EEOC's Enforcement
Guidance.108
2. The ADEA Definition
The Supreme Court first interpreted the term "subterfuge" in
two cases under the ADEA, which contains an exemption provision for
employee benefit plans similar to section 501(c). In United Air Lines,
Inc. v. McMann,0 9 the Court found the ADEA subterfuge clause
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
104. This view is supported by legislative history which states: "In sum, section 501(c) is
intended to afford insurers and employers the same opportunities they would enjoy in the
absence of this legislation to design and administer insurance products and benefit plans in a
manner that is consistent with basic principles of insurance risk classification." H.R. Rep. No.
101-485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 137-38 (1990).
105. A "bona fide" plan is one that "exists and pays benefits." United Air Lines, Inc. v.
McMann, 434 U.S.192, 194 (1977).
106. These varying interpretations cover a broad spectrum. See, for example, Farber, 69
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 907-14 (cited in note 27) (advocating an intent-based standard along the lines
of Title VII Civil Rights Acts cases); McFadden, 28 Tort & Ins. L. J. at 501-502 (cited in note
101) (advocating a "cost-justification" test based on the Rehabilitation Act).
107. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602,
codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1994 ed.).
108. See generally EEOC Guidance (cited in note 89).
109. 434 U.S. 192 (1977). The plaintiff in McMann was automatically retired, over his
objection, pursuant to a formal retirement income plan. Id. at 194. The plan had been insti-
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unambiguous on its face, and thus assigned "subterfuge" its ordinary
meaning: "a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion."110
Further, the McMann Court found that this definition required a
showing of intent to evade the Act and rejected the business or
economic purpose test that had been proffered by lower courts and the
EEOC.111
In Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts,12 the
Court further concluded that to give proper effect to the ADEA's
exemption for benefit plans, and not to render it "nugatory," a plan
could not be a "subterfuge" unless it was "a method of discriminating
in other, non-fringe-benefit aspects of the employment relation-
ship. ... 113 The Betts Court also held that the construction of the
benefit plan exemption did not suggest that employers had to assert it
as a defense, as the EEOC had concluded, but rather that the
exemption "redefine[d] the elements of the plaintiffs prima facie
case." Therefore, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show
subterfuge.115
Under the ADA, several courts have followed the Supreme
Court's ADEA interpretation of "subterfuge." The D.C. Circuit
adopted the Betts definition when interpreting section 501(c) in
Modderno v. King."6 The Modderno court found that the Supreme
tuted in 1941, long before the passage of the ADEA in 1967. Id. at 193. The relevant ADEA
provision stated: "it shall not be unlawful for an employer.., or labor organization to observe
the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a
retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this"
Act. Id. at 195-96 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623()(2)). Pursuant to an intent-based definition based
on the ordinary meaning of "subterfuge," the Court concluded that a plan such as the one in
dispute could not be a subterfuge to evade an Act that was passed twenty-six years later. Id. at
203.
Several years later, the Court revisited its definition of subterfuge in Public Employees
Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989). In 1978, Congress amended the ADEA
to change the result of McMann, but did not change, remove, or define the subterfuge language.
Id. at 167-68. Though lower courts had treated this as a congressional rejection of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of "subterfuge," the Supreme Court saw no reason to change its earlier
interpretation because Congress had left the subterfuge language untouched. Id. at 168. Under
this definition of "subterfuge" the Court once again denied relief to the plaintiff in question. Id.
at 177. Following this ruling, Congress decided to remove the subterfuge language from the
Act. Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1064.
110. McMann, 434 U.S. at 203.
111. Id.
112. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
113. Id. at 177.
114. Id. at 181.
115. Id. at 181-82.
116. 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In Modderno, the ex-wife of a Foreign Service officer
was hospitalized for mental illness from 1988 to 1991. Id. at 1060. She claimed that the
$75,000 lifetime cap placed on mental health benefits in 1991 under the Foreign Service Benefit
Plan violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, as amended by § 501(c) of the
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Court's ADEA definition was controlling because Betts was decided
before Congress inserted the subterfuge language in the ADA.117 The
Modderno court reasoned that Congress "was on full alert" of the
Court's understanding of "subterfuge," and thus could have avoided
the interpretation through the use of available "linguistic devices."118
In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,119 the Eighth Circuit
explicitly adopted the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, 120 refusing to
accept legislative history that the plaintiff claimed showed Congress's
intent to reject the Betts definition. 21 Thus, both the Eighth Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit have concluded that a benefit plan can only be a
subterfuge under the ADA, and thus subject to full restrictions, if the
employer intended to discriminate in a non-fringe benefit aspect of
employment.
When the McMann-Betts definition of subterfuge is applied to
the ADA, an employer cannot refuse to hire a qualified applicant with
a mental illness merely because of a potential increase in the cost of
insurance or because the employer's plan does not cover the appli-
cant's disability. 22 The plaintiff, however, carries a heavy burden of
proof of discriminatory intent. The defendant-employer must only
proffer some actuarial basis for the challenged decision to make the
plaintiffs case rather difficult to prove. As a result, this definition of
subterfuge still leaves current employee plan limitations and benefit
reductions largely exempted from the ADA under the safe harbor
provision of section 501(c).123
ADA. Id. at 1063-64. The court rejected this claim, relying primarily on the Supreme's Coures
specific holdings in McMann and Betts concerning pre-enactment plans. Id. at 1064-65. The
plaintiff also claimed that the plan violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, regardless of the
ADA amendment. Id. at 1060-63. The court found that the plaintiff failed to state a claim
under unamended § 504. Id. at 1063. Interestingly enough, the monetary cap in question would
not violate the MHPA, which only applies to private employee benefit plans.
117. Id. at 1065.
118. Id.
119. 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
120. Id. at 679.
121. Id. The court reasoned that if "Congress intended to reject the Betts definition of
subterfuge when it enacted the ADA, it could have done so expressly by incorporating language
for that purpose into the bill that Congress voted on and the President signed." Id.
122. See Piquard v. City of East Peoria, 887 F. Supp. 1106, 1123 (C.D. Ill. 1995) (noting
that legislative history supports the "non-fringe benefits" interpretation in this regard).
123. See John English, Comment, Self-Insured Group Medical Plans: A Search for
Protection of Benefits, 22 Cap. U. L. Rev. 749, 766 (1993) CIf the differences between the ADEA
and the ADA are not significant, and the comparison between the two Acts is appropriate,
employees like Jack McGann receive no help from the subterfuge clause of section 12201(c).").
See also note 59 (discussing McGann).
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3. The EEOC Definition
The EEOC set forth its own definition of "subterfuge" in its
interpretive guidance on the ADA. The EEOC defined "subterfuge" as
a "disability-based disparate treatment that is not justified by the
risks or costs associated with the disability.' 124 The primary support
for this interpretation is the ADA's legislative history, which states
that an employee benefit plan not based on sound actuarial principles
or reasonably anticipated experience constitutes subterfuge. 125 The
EEOC also diverged from the McMann/Betts interpretation by
placing the burden of proof on the defendant to show no subterfuge. 126
Plaintiffs have advocated 27 this definition of "subterfuge," which has
124. EEOC Guidance at 405:7120 (cited in note 89). Two courts have explicitly rejected this
definition. In Modderno, the D.C. Circuit saw no difference between the ADA situation and the
ADEA situation in Betts in which the Labor Department proffered a cost-based test that the
Supreme Court rejected. Moderno, 82 F.3d at 1065. The court further explained that the
EEOC's interpretation could not be controlling because it contradicted the plain language of the
statute. Id. See also, Piquard, 887 F.Supp. at 1125 (noting that "the plain language of Section
501(c)'s 'subterfuge' sentence does not mention the risks or costs of a disability-based
distinction").
125. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 71 (cited in note 104). Moreover, in direct
contradiction to the ruling in Modderno, the legislative history indicates that a plan can be a
subterfuge regardless of the date the plan was adopted. Id.
126. EEOC Guidance at 405:7118-20 (cited in note 89). The EEOC reasoned that in the
health insurance context the employer has the greatest access to the relevant cost information
and therefore should be required to carry the burden. Id. At least in principle, though varying
in its overall approach to section 501(c), one court has explicitly agreed with the EEOC on this
matter. Piquard, 887 F. Supp. at 1125-26.
The EEOC also enumerated several ways in which an employer could justify a "disability-
based" distinction.
The respondent may prove that the disparate treatment is justified by legitimate
actuarial data, or by actual or reasonably anticipated experience .... In other
words.... the disability-based disparate treatment is attributable to the application of
legitimate risk classification and underwriting procedures to the increased risks (and
thus increased costs to the health insurance plan) of the disability, and not to the
disability per se.
The respondent may prove that the disparate treatment is necessary... to ensure
that the challenged health insurance plan satisfies the commonly accepted or legally
required standards for the fiscal soundness of such an insurance plan.
The respondent may prove that the challenged insurance practice or activity is
necessary ... to prevent the occurrence of an unacceptable change either in the coverage
of the health insurance plan, or in the premiums charged for the health insurance plan.
EEOC Guidance at 405:7120-21 (cited in note 89) (citations omitted).
127. See, for example, Holmes v. City of Aurora, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 463, *14 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 17, 1995); Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (1995) (stating the
plaintiffs claim that the insurance practices in question "are not based on sound acturial data
and are therefore a mere subterfuge used to evade the purposes of the [ADA]"); United States v.
State of Illinois, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12890, *15-17 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1994) (setting forth
plaintiffs' argument that a board's determination regarding a pension plan constituted "a
subterfuge because it is based on stereotypical notions and myths about people with diabetes
and not based on sound actuarial principles as is requred by the ADA"); Schroeder v.
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not won overwhelming approval in the district courts. A three-judge
panel of the Sixth Circuit in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co.,128 a decision recently vacated but slated to be reheard en banc, 125
appeared to reject the Supreme Court's (McMann/Betts) definition of
subterfuge, suggesting, though not explicitly alluding to, the influence
of the EEOC's view. 130 The court concluded that the distinction in the
plaintiff-employee's disability insurance plan between mental and
physical disabilities would violate the ADA if it was not justified by
"'sound actuarial principles' or 'actual or reasonably anticipated
experience' or 'bona fide risk classification.' "131 The potential
underlying message is that the terms of health benefit plans may be
subjected to judicial scrutiny, narrowing the 501(c) exemption further
than does the McMann/Betts definition of subterfuge.13 2
Under the EEOC view of subterfuge, mental illness limitations
may be more vulnerable to ADA regulation. Mental health advocates
could assert that limitations on mental health insurance stem from
misguided perceptions or invidious bias against the mentally ill,133 not
the application of defensible risk classification.134 More specifically, a
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 18 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rptr. 554, 554 (D.D.C. 1994))
(stating the coures contention that "[l]ustifications for differential treatment are in the nature of
affirmative defenses" in the context of mental illness limitation in disability benefits).
128. 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated in 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2161 (6th Cir. Feb. 6,
1997).
129. Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins., Co., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2161, *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 6,
1997). Though no specific grounds were given, a majority of the judges sitting on the circuit
voted to rehear the case en banc. Id. The rehearing is scheduled for June 11, 1997. Id.
130. The Parker court explicitly disagreed with the Modderno court, relying on the
legislative history of the ADA to construe the meaning of section 501(c). Parker, 99 F.3d at 192.
The court first determined that section 501(c) was ambiguous on its face. Id. at 190.
The problem with Parker is that it is unclear what the true statutory basis for its conclusion
is, just as it is unclear in the legislative history. Compare H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 70
(cited in note 89) (invoking "sound actuarial data" in the context of subparagraph (1) of section
501(c)), with H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136-37 (cited in note 89) (invoking "sound actuarial
principles" and "actual or reasonably anticipated experience" in the context of the subterfuge
clause). At first, the decision appears to be based on the subterfuge clause, since the court
rejects the Modderno ruling. However, the basis also appears to be in subparagraph (1) of
section 501(c), not the subterfuge language, because the court states that "even if a practice did
not qualify as 'evasive' under the subterfuge provision, it might still be violative of the Act if it
was based on speculation, and not on sound actuarial principles, actual or reasonably
anticipated experience, or bona fide risk classification." Parker, 99 F.3d at 192. Perhaps this
confusion played a role in the decision to vacate the judgment.
131. Parker, 99 F.3d at 193.
132. This ruling worried employers and insurers, who feared that the continuing validity of
mental illness limitations may be undermined by this interpretation of the ADA. Nancy Ann
Jeffrey, Mental-Health Ruling Alarms Employers, Wall St. J. BIO (Jan. 22, 1997).
133. See Rubenstein, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 349-351 (cited in 13) (discussing the historical
bias and discrimination against those with mental disabilities).
134. See Cook, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. at 362 (cited in note 13) (arguing that "the mental-
physical distinction masquerades as a risk classification").
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plaintiff suffering from a mental disability with a proven biological
basis could assert that a distinction in her health care plan between
certain biologically-based mental illnesses and "physical" diseases
such as Parkinson's disease is evidence of a lack of sound principles or
of stereotypical notions and has no cost-effectiveness basis when
compared to treatment for illnesses such as heart disease. 135
Moreover, the common preference for inpatient treatment over less-
expensive outpatient treatment may reveal a faulty cost
assessment.136 If courts agreed with these arguments, a court could
find a mental illness limitation to be a "subterfuge" in violation of the
ADA, requiring relief for the disabled party.'37 The question remains,
however, whether such relief is the correct result under section 501(c).
4. Conclusion: No Legislative or Judicial Relief
Perhaps Judge Gilbert Merritt of the Sixth Circuit best
described Congress's approach to insurance practices in the ADA
when he wrote:
Unlike the language of Title III, which is quite clear, the meaning of the
"safe harbor" provision is not self-evident. In fact, the statute appears to be
purposefully vague in order to satisfy contending interest groups. Unable to
decide on exactly what it intended to legislate, Congress inserted language
which looks in two directions. One provision attempts to appease the
insurance industry; the other provisions attempt to help the large group of
disabled people. In doing so, Congress has again left this Court in the position
to give meaning to conflicting statutory language designed as a political com-
promise.
We find that, in this instance, the statute is totally ambiguous on its
face.'
38
135. See note 42 (discussing Sen. Domenici's comments on the comparative effectiveness of
mental health care). See also Rubenstein, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 350-51 (cited in note 13)
('[W]hen measured by typical rationing criteria, such as efficacy, cost-effectiveness, or quality of
life, many mental health interventions emerge quite well") (citations omitted).
136. Ramage, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 970-71 (cited in note 16).
137. To some extent, the EEOas view of subterfuge could transform courts into forums for
the discussion and determination of public policy issues. This tendency is reflected in the fact
that the proffered arguments against mental illness limitations under the ADA sound very
similar to those made in the context of the MiHPA. See Part II.A.2 (discussing the arguments
for parity). Courts, however, have expressed a wariness about allowing this discussion to occur
in this context. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 194 C[l]t is not the role of the courts to write insurance
policies"); Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1060 (refusing to entertain the plaintiffs arguments regarding
"basic justice," "prudential calculus," and "social research" in the context of a challenge to a
mental illness limitation).
138. Parker, 99 F.3d at 190. A similar sentiment was expressed in the dissenting view of
Representative Chuck Douglas of New Hampshire concerning section 501(c): "Congress is
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The "political" choice that courts face in defining subterfuge is
intriguing. The McMann/Betts definition obviously favors the busi-
ness community in the battle to preserve its freedom from regulatory
interference with employee benefit plans. A decision to apply the
EEOC definition, on the other hand, is a victory for the community of
individuals suffering from disabilities.139 The latter approach,
however, relies on the "ambiguity" of the subterfuge language. This
"ambiguity" was probably all too clear to Congress and the business
and insurance communities when the ADA was drafted. Parker is
thus in the distinct minority among courts interpreting the subterfuge
clause. The majority of courts will probably continue to adopt the
McMann/Betts definition. Though this may seem untenable to some
judges,140 Congress seems to have succeeded in preserving the ongoing
parity battle for another day.
While courts could opt for far-reaching interpretations of sec-
tion 501(c),14 1 they are not to blame for the ultimate lack of protection
the ADA affords. Had Congress wished to subject the terms of health
benefit plans to rigorous scrutiny though the use of the term
"subterfuge," it should have done so more explicitly, especially in light
of the Supreme Court's subterfuge precedent.142 In other words, the
ADA's perceived lack of effectiveness is the result of Congress's own
uncertainty. Of course, caught in the political crossfire and fearing
repercussions, Congress may have purposely crafted an ambiguous
statute in the hopes that the courts and administrative agencies
would reach a compromise similar to that in the EEOC's Guidance, in
which the ADA reaches issues such as highly controversial limits on
abrogating it [sic] constitutional duty by writing vague laws which must be clarified by the
Federal courts." H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 94 (cited in note 89).
139. Parker, 99 F.3d at 192.
140. See id. at 192 ("It seems unlikely that Congress would leave the insurance industry
virtually untouched by a statute that is designed to address 'the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.' ").
141. See Orentlicher, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 87 (cited in note 4) (stating that
"judicial interpretations have given inadequate recognition to the protections embodied" in the
ADA").
142. The EEOC's interpretation of subterfuge is particularly troubling when the parallels
between the ADEA and the ADA are considered. Under the ADEA, the Supreme Court rejected
the EEOC's cost-justification test, Piquard, 887 F. Supp. at 1125 (citing Betts, 492 U.S. at 169-
75), which is remarkably similar to the EEOC's interpretation of subterfuge under the ADA.
Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected the ADEA's legislative history, which asserted that
benefit plans enacted prior to the enactment of the ADEA could still be a subterfuge. Betts, 492
U.S. at 167-68. Since the statutory term "subterfuge" seems to track a similar course in both
acts, logically the term should have the same definition under the ADA as it did under the
ADEA_
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AIDS benefits, while leaving untouched broader distinctions, most
notably the mental illness limitations143
In short, the mental illness limitation falls outside the scope of
judicial and legislative concern under the ADA. If, however, the Sixth
Circuit in its rehearing of Parker agrees with the D.C. and Eighth
Circuits, and other circuits follow suit in foreclosing relief under sec-
tion 501(c), then Congress, if it truly disagrees with the courts' inter-
pretations, may amend the ADA and more clearly outline its
intentions.
IV. FURTHER CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS: OBSTACLES, ALTERNATIVES,
AND SOLUTIONS
Part IV addresses the possible future of further congressional
reforms in the regulation of private mental health insurance. First,
Part IV sets forth two possible characterizations of the "compromises"
embodied in the MHPA and the ADA. Second, the possibility of a
federal minimum mental health benefits mandate is examined,
followed by an analysis of a proposed parity mandate that would
extend only to severe mental illnesses. Finally, Part IV discusses
managed mental health care, with an emphasis on the legislation
needed to achieve parity in this setting.
A. Legislative "Subterfuge" or "Schizophrenia"?
[A] subterfuge is a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion.'4
As the MHPA and the ADA illustrate, Congress has great diffi-
culty in making truly substantive changes to the current regulation of
employee health benefit plans. This observation is not necessarily a
criticism. It does, however, illustrate the real tension that exists
between insurance practices and anti-discrimination efforts145 This
tension necessitates compromise, which, in the context of the ADA
143. See note 89 (discussing the EEOUs interpretation of insurance limitations scrutinized
under section 501(c)).
144. United Air Lines, Inc., 434 U.S. at 203.
145. Indeed, certain coverage distinctions and limitations made for purposes of risk classifi-
cation have been referred to as "fair discrimination." Wortham, 19 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 361
(cited in note 40)).
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and the MHPA, can be characterized as either congressional
"subterfuge"'146 or "schizophrenia."147
Health legislation is generally characterized by initial legisla-
tive aspirations of an "access egalitarian dimension."148 Concerns
about the costs of reform, however, often undo these egalitarian
aspirations.149 The result, many times, is a law that symbolically
embodies broad access goals but lacks a real statutory commitment to
achieving those goals.50 In this context, the terms "subterfuge" and
"schizophrenia," though describing the same statutory result, denote a
difference in congressional intent. Legislative "subterfuge" refers to
an intentional evasion of important, but difficult issues;
"schizophrenia," however, suggests no invidious intent on Congress's
part, but is instead a "biologically-based," or structurally inherent,
defect that results from the difficulty of coordinating and resolving
the diverse political goals of the various members of Congress.
These two terms are both very fitting in the cases of the ADA
and the MHPA. Generally, one's conception of the motives behind the
MHPA's and the ADA's treatment of insurance practices will reflect
one's choice of characterization. If characterized as "subterfuge," then
the MHPA is a rather disturbing example of Congress paying lip
service to an issue like parity in hopes of appearing sympathetic to
the issue, 151 but, in truth, having no real intention of making any
meaningful resource commitment to that end. The long-term fear of
mental health advocates is that Congress has passed the MHPA as a
means of pacifying active interest groups or individual members of
Congress and of suppressing the issue of equality in mental health
insurance.152 Likewise, the ADA could be "subterfuge" in the sense
146. The use of the term "subterfuge" in this section should not be confused with the statu-
tory term "subterfuge" in the ADA, as discussed in Part III.B.
147. See note 23 and accompanying text (characterizing the legislative compromise of
competing interests in health care as 'legislative schizophrenia"). The use of the term
"schizophrenia" in this context is actually misleading. Schizophrenia is oftentimes confused
with multiple personality disorder, Shannon, 24 St. Mary's L. J. at 367 n.4 (cited in note 16),
which is the spirit in which the term is used in this section of this Note. The medical condition
"schizophrenia," however, actually causes "poor reasoning, disconnected and confusing
language, hallucinations [and] delusions," not multiple personalities. Id. Of course, many
would argue that Congress and its actions are more accurately characterized by this true,
scientific definition.
148. Blumstein, 69 Iowa L. Rev. at 1233 (cited in note 23).
149. Id. at 1234.
150. Id.
151. The Senate paid lip service to mental health parity by approving the sweeping
Domenici proposal, when it was already apparent that the proposal would be defeated during
conference negotiations. See note 65 and accompanying text (quoting comments made by
Senator Dole after voting for the proposal to the effect that it was very problematic).
152. See Part II.C.2. (discussing potential policy implications of MHPA).
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that Congress, rather than dealing with the tough issues itself, has
left the task to the courts and administrative agencies in order to
avoid political backlash.153 This avoidance manifests itself as a sweep-
ing ban on discrimination undercut by a broad statutory exemption.
The exemption is then further complicated by an undefined exception,
the interpretation of which is confused by legislative history contra-
dicting the only prior possible interpretation of the language of the
statutory exception. 154
Attributing an invidious intent to Congress, however, may be
unfair, especially in light of the difficulty of the parity issue.
Rectifying tensions between insurance and antidiscrimination law is a
long and arduous process. Perhaps the greatest victory for mental
health advocates in the battle over parity has already been won by
getting the word "discrimination" applied to their cause. Insurers,
however, still claim valid justification for their discriminatory under-
writing practices, while mental health advocates see only attempts at
rationalizing those practices. 155 Indeed, insurance underwriters seem
to be in conflict with one another. One of the primary purposes of
insurance is to spread costs among the many so that those few
unfortunate ones can bear the cost of catastrophic illness.156 Benefit
planners and insurance companies concerned about rising costs,
however, seek either to limit the chances of these risks occurring in
their plans through blanket exclusions or to ameliorate the costs of
those not suffering such risks by shifting them to those who do
153. See note 143 and accompanying text (suggesting that Congress may have created
confusion in the ADA to avoid political repercussions).
154. See Part II.B (discussing the ADA's insurance safe harbor and the statutory term
"subterfuge"). As one congressman noted:
The term 'subterfuge' is used in the ADA simply to denote a means of evading the
purposes of the ADA. It does not mean that there must be some malicious intent to
evade the ADA on the part of the insurance company or other organization, nor does it
mean that a plan is automatically shielded just because it was put into place before the
ADA was passed. Indeed, there is currently a bill moving though Congress to overturn
the Betts decision and we have no intention of repeating a decision in the ADA with
which we do not agree.
136 Cong. Rec. H4624 (July 12, 1990) (statement of Representative Edwards). See also 136
Cong. Rec. S9697 (July 13, 1990) ("It is important to note that the term 'subterfuge,' as used in
the ADA, should not be interpreted in the manner in which the Supreme Court interpreted the
term.") (statement of Senator Kennedy).
155. See Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. of Health
Politics, Policy, & L. 287, 296 (1993) (The numerical system, and the underwriting guidelines
and rating manuals.., have all the trappings of scientific objectivity ... but they often seem to
be based as much on social prejudices and stereotypes as on empirical knowledge.").
156. Id. at 290-92.
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through individualized premiums. 157  These tensions are further
accentuated in the mental health context in light of the professional
and public disagreement over the cost-effectiveness of psychiatric
care.
Further, though some in Congress have applied the language
of discrimination to mental health coverage, the MHPA and the ADA
suggest that a majority of Congress still sees a great divide between
some common insurance practices, including the mental illness
coverage limitation, and unlawful discrimination. In fact, the ADA's
legislative history recognizes "that benefit plans.., need to be able to
continue business practices in the way they underwrite, classify, and
administer risks."1 8 In other words, continued limitation of private
insurance benefits, even if "discriminatory" in some way, may need to
give way to the overwhelming cost constraints that presently saddle
employee benefit plans. Alternatively, this denial of benefits may
represent the effect of harsh market forces, not the effects of unlawful
discrimination. If a majority of Congress accepts either of these two
views, any future legislative "compromises" will likely fall far short of
the broad access goals these "compromises" idealistically embody, as
do the MHPA and the ADA.
B. Alternatives or Potential Solutions
1. A Better Compromise: A Minimum Mandate
To solve the schizophrenia/subterfuge problem of weak parity
protection, lawmakers could create a statute that guarantees some
real protection for the mentally ill. A minimum coverage mandate
that sets certain minimum levels for dollar caps, outpatient visits,
inpatient stays, and a maximum copayment percentage would provide
such protection. 59 Several problems exist, however, with such a
proposed mandate. Minimum mandates could become the de facto
maximum for mental health benefits among insurers. 160 Moreover,
such a mandate could signal the end of federal legislative reform, thus
157. See id. at 293 (noting that insurers reason that "[p]eople who have diseases or serious
risks to their health are in a sense getting a more valuable insurance policy than those with
lesser risks, so they ought to pay more for the extra value").
158. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 138 (cited in note 104) (emphasis added).
159. Not only would such a mandate guarantee access to a certain level of care, but it could
also relieve insurers of the effects of adverse selection. See note 33 (discussing the use of
minimum mandates to combat adverse selection).
160. Lambert and McGuire, 15 J. Health Politics, Policy, & L. at 171 (cited in note 51).
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extinguishing further efforts toward full parity. The business and
insurance community likely would oppose mandatory minimums from
a cost perspective. Studies evaluating the effects of state insurance
regulation in general have identified minimum mental health
mandates as some of the most costly of these measures, reducing the
affordability of health plans.161 Further, employers would argue that
the financial burden of such mandates would fall on those with severe
physical illness, since benefit reductions would be necessary in those
areas in order to offset the increase in mental health benefits. In
addition, the complexity of the mental health delivery system may
render such simplistic legislative reform efforts, including blanket
parity provisions, ineffective at providing the most needed and cost-
effective treatment. 162
2. Parity for "Severe" Mental Illness
Congress could also pass legislation mandating coverage and
requiring parity specifically for "severe" or "serious" mental
illnesses. 163 In terms of need and fairness, such legislation may be the
best possible approach. Such an approach would guarantee a higher
level of care for those most in need.164 Moreover, if such legislation
further was limited to those severe mental illnesses with a proven
biological basis, it would treat equally all biologically-based illnesses,
whether "physical" or "mental."165 Support for this approach appears
to exist, to at least some extent, on both sides of the debate.
1 66
161. Mental Health, Obstetrical Care Coverage Most Costly of State-Mandated Benefits on
Insurance Carriers, GAO Concludes in Report to Sen. Jaffords, 8 Health News Daily 1, 1 (Sept.
25, 1996).
162. The number of treatment possibilities and the multitude of goals that mental health
care encompasses create this complexity. Creative coverage packages may be crucial to cost-
effectiveness. See generally Sharfstein and Stoline, 11 Health Affairs at 84 (cited in note 11);
Richard G. Frank, Howard H. Goldman, and Thomas G. McGuire, A Model Mental Health
Benefit in Private Health Insurance, 11 Health Affairs 98 (Fall 1992).
163. See, for example, Tex. Ins. Code Ann. Art. 3.51-14 (Vernon Supp. 1997); 24-A Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 4234-A (West Supp., 1996). The Texas statute reads in pertinent part:
The coverage offered under this article for services and benefits for the condition of
serious mental illness must be at least as favorable as the coverage made available for
services and benefits provided by the insuring entity for other major illnesses and must
include the same durational limits, amount limits, deductibles, and coinsurance factors.
Tex. Ins. Code Ann. Art. 3.51-14 § 3. For a synopsis of the legislative experience of Texas, see
Shannon, 24 St. Mary's L. J. at 390-95 (cited in note 16).
164. See Shannon, 24 St. Mary's L. J. at 373-374 (cited in note 16) (advocating
differentiation between biologically-based mental illness and emotionally-based mental illness).
165. Id. at 397.
166. See Vatz and Weinberg, USA Today (Magazine) at 37 (cited in note 30) (critics of
parity conceding that "mandated coverage of only severe mental illness,"... "satisfy cost
consideration [and] reflect public opinion").
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Congress, however, does not appear to be receptive to such legislation,
as evidenced by the lack of success of Senator Domenici's "Equitable
Health Insurance Coverage of Severe Mental Illness Act" proposed in
1992.167
An approach limited to "severe" or "serious" mental illnesses,
however, has several problems. Obviously, a large number of those
who suffer from mental illness could be excluded from any coverage
because their conditions are not "severe" enough to warrant care.16
8
And if only biologically-based illnesses would merit mandatory
coverage, patients would face further barriers to relief. Costs would
also remain a viable concern, since those with severe mental illness,
though few in number, use a high percentage of the total dollars spent
on all mental health care. 169 The focus on the "severity" of illness
could have the potential of focusing funding on the treatment of
illness at its most acute stages, while effectively denying funds for
cost-effective preventative care in the early stages of illness.170
Another problem is defining "severe" mental illness. If legisla-
tion simply referred to "severe" or "serious" illness, the impetus for
provider-payer and patient-payer disputes is apparent. 71 An easy
solution to this problem would be to specifically list the illnesses
167. S. 2696, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. (May 12, 1992), in 138 Cong. Rec. S6490-91 (May 12,
1992). Senator Domenici's bill called for coverage of "treatment of severe mental illnesses" that
would be "equitable and commensurate" with coverage for physical illnesses. S. 2696 § 3(a)(2),
in 138 Cong. Rec. at S6491.
In the wake of the MHPA, Senator Domenici reopened this possibility by suggesting that the
next step should be congressional authorization of a study aimed at defining chemically and
biologically related diseases of the brain. VA.HUD Conferees Keep Amendments on Maternity
Stay, Mental Health Parity, 4 Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) 1497 (Sept. 23, 1996).
168. See Boyle, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 445 (cited in note 31) (stating that the fear of
advocates for persons with less severe mental illness is that such individuals will receive
nothing when a high priority is placed on access for those with severe illness). Critics of the
severe mental illness approach promote "the role of mental state in the maintenance and
deterioration of good physical health," Prager and Scallet, 11 Health Affairs at 120 (cited in note
45), and fear that the biologically-based movement has minimized the suffering and potential
disability caused by less severe forms of mental illness. Id. at 120-23.
169. See note 33 (discussing the high percentage of costs incurred by those with severe
illnesses). This argument was the primary one used in opposition to the Texas legislation.
Shannon, 24 St. Mary's L. J. at 392 (cited in note 16).
170. See Barbara Edwards Gelbard, Thoughts on Disease Management in Behavioral Care
An Old Practice Becomes a New Concept-and Enters a New Field, 16 Behavioral Health
Management 8 (Sept. 19, 1996) ("[To the extent high-intensity [acute] care can be diverted by
the use of earlier, lower-cost symptom management techniques, the total expenditure to provide
care ... can be reduced.").
171. Senator Domenici's 1992 parity bill referred only to "severe mental illnesses." S. 2696
§ 3(a)(2), in 138 Cong. Rec. at S6491. This term is troubling because of the lack of guidance it
gives as to the covered illnesses, particularly in light of the proven ability and willingness of
providers to diagnose around such undefined terms. See note 30 and accompanying text.
Perhaps Senator Domenici knew of this tendency and hoped to capitalize on it with a vague bill.
788
MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT
encompassed by such legislation.172 This solution, however, would be
very restrictive and would give insurers a basis for excluding other
mental conditions from their plans. A second possibility would be to
specifically align "severe" mental illness with those illnesses that
have a proven biological basis. 173 While being both restrictive and
exclusionary, this approach would also be contrary to the ethical
notion that the suffering of the patient, not the etiology of that suffer-
ing, should be the primary concern 74 and would seem to suggest that
only those conditions that most closely resemble "physical" illnesses
should be given equal treatment. In essence, this approach belittles
the "psychological" aspects of mental illness.
Another possible approach would be to limit equality of cover-
age to those mental health treatments that are most closely related to
traditional medical treatments, such as drug therapy and hospital
stays. Some commentators, however, see such legislation as poten-
tially undermining the parity notion, because certain unique and
necessary mental health treatments may not be deemed appropriate
health care benefits. 175 Moreover, such an approach may not be cost-
effective, since nontraditional, outpatient treatments are generally
less expensive than traditional ones. 76
3. Parity in the Managed Care Context 77
Though the move toward managed mental health care is al-
ready well under way, 78 the MHPA will likely push employers to
172. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 3.51-14, § 1 (listing schizophrenia, paranoia and other
psychotic disorders, bipolar disorders, major depressive disorders, and schizo-affective disor-
ders); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 24-A § 4234-A(6)(A) (listing schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, pervasive
developmental disorder or autism, paranoia, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and
major depressive disorder).
173. See note 42 and accompanying text (discussing mental illnesses with a biological
basis). One commentator specifically endorses this approach. Shannon, 24 St. Mary's L. J. at
374 (cited in note 16).
174. See Boyle, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 453 (cited in note 31) ("The etiology of a disease is
less important than the fact that a person suffers from that disease") (citation omitted).
175. Ridgely and Goldman, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 428 (cited in note 9). See also Sabin and
Daniels, 24 Hastings Center Rep. at 10 (cited in note 29) ("[S]ome forms of mental health
treatment... seem similar to nonprofessional forms of human support and interaction.").
176. See Equitable Health Care for Severe Mental Illnesses Act of 1993, S.2696 § 4(b)(3),
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 12, 1992), in 138 Cong. Rec. S6491 (May 12, 1996) (setting forth, as
part of a model plan for mental health care, "[c]overage of outpatient medical management with
coinsurance and provider reimbursement set on par with other medical procedures to encourage
the use of cost-effective ambulatory treatment, including treatment in non-traditional settings")
(emphasis added).
177. A full discussion of the topic of managed mental health care is beyond the scope of this
Note. For a thorough discussion of the issues involved, see Boyle, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 437
(cited in note 31); Iglehart, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 131 (cited in note 31).
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adopt managed care at an accelerated rate. 179  This movement has
"provoked unprecedented turmoil"180 for mental health providers and
created a sharp conflict within the mental health community. 18' One
of the sources of this turmoil is the fear that the cost-containment
focus of managed care may create restrictive access barriers to treat-
ment-barriers that could be even more restrictive than traditional
mental illness limitations.82 Though these barriers include mental
illness limitations, managed care uses other techniques to limit a
beneficiary's access to care. Therefore, legislation mandating "fill"
parity, that is, equality in monetary caps, durational limits,
coinsurance rates, and deductibles, still would fail to address the
ways in which managed care provides unequal treatment access to
those suffering from mental illness.
Recent studies have shown the effectiveness of managed care
at controlling costs.' 83 Managed care controls costs by limiting the
amount of services used through various monitoring and review
techniques. 84  In theory, utilization review of this kind could
eliminate arbitrary mental illness caps by supplanting them with
utilization controls.185  Currently, however, managed care programs
commonly use such caps to limit outpatient and hospital visits.186
With such utilization controls come concerns that access to
care will be compromised. For example, managed care organizations
frequently restrict access to care for those with severe mental ill-
178. See Boyle, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 437 (cited in note 31) C'By most accounts this move
towards managed care, including managed mental health, is unstoppable.').
179. For a discussion of this assertion, see Part II.D.1.
180. Iglehart, 334 New Eng. J. Med. at 131 (cited in note 31).
181. This conflict is best exemplified by the 1995 campaign for president of the American
Psychiatric Association. The victor, Dr. Harold I. Eist, used an anti-managed care platform to
defeat Dr. Steven S. Sharfstein, a more prominent national figure. Id. Specifically, Dr. Eist
accused Dr. Sharfstein of selling out to managed care, since the mental health facility over
which Dr. Sharfstein was chief executive officer had contracted out many of its services to a
managed care organization. Id. The election was decided by a close vote of 7762 to 7391. Id. at
133-34.
182. See Rubenstein, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 318 (cited in note 13) (referring to managed
care as a potential "new method of denying access to services").
183. Iglehart, 334 New Eng. J. Med. at 131 (cited in note 31).
184. Id. Managed care limits the delivery of services to approved providers, reviews treat-
ment decisions of providers ("utilization review"), and closely monitors high-cost cases. Id.
185. See 142 Cong. Rec. S3591 (Apr. 18, 1996) (remarks of Senator Domenici) ("The era of
managed care is upon us, making tight management of patient care the norm, and artificial cost
measures to reduce utilization are a thing of the past."); Arons, et al., 13 Health Affairs at 197
(cited in note 85) ("The advantage of management and payment approaches to cost control is
that they do not depend on limitation of coverage.").
186. Iglehart, 334 New Eng. J. Med. at 131 (cited in note 31).
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ness. 187 More importantly, when utilization controls are used, deter-
minations of what care is "medically necessary and appropriate"' 188 in
managed care plans may preserve the bias and undervaluing of men-
tal health care that mental health advocates claim inheres in mental
illness coverage limitations.89 Considering the rift that already exists
between the mental health community and the insurance community,
the reviewing of physician decisions to make these determinations is
bound to be fraught with endless contention. 190 As a result the
discrepancies that exist between mental and physical health coverage
could remain at the same levels or worsen, even if mental illness
limitations are eliminated.
To ensure parity in the managed care setting, legislation must
require that determinations of medical necessity in the context of
treatment for mental illness are made according to the same
standards used for such determinations in regard to physical
illness.' 91 Ideally, under this approach, the cost-effectiveness of the
treatment, not the underlying illness, would be the sole determinant
of whether access to care should be granted.
Several problems arise, however, when evaluating such an
approach. One must question whether consistent standards and cost-
187. See id. ('Most managed care plans do not cover chronic mental illnesses in their
standard benefits package."). Studies show, however, that a larger number of patients receive
care under managed care than under traditional fee-for-service care. Boyle, 40 St. Louis U. L. J.
at 444-45 (cited in note 31). In addition, a study from the U.S. General Accounting Office shows
that patients are more satisfied with managed care than with fee-for-service arrangements. Id.
at 444 (citation omitted).
188. Managed care decisions on whether to cover treatment hinges primarily on
determinations of "medical necessity." Sabin and Daniels, 24 Hastings Center Rep. at 5 (cited in
note 29).
189. See id. (noting that "[m]any insurance administrators believe that judgments about
medical necessity in mental health are less precise than similar judgments in other areas of
medicine"). See also Boyle, 40 St. Louis U. L. J. at 453 (cited in note 31) (noting that it has been
argued "'medical necessity' and 'medically effective'.., foster individualized if not subjective
and bias-ridden interpretations").
190. See 5 Health Law Rep. (BNA) 978 (June 27, 1996) (stating that managed care
companies are "practicing psychology without a license or without a shred of competence")
(quoting Donald Bernstein, Director of Professional Affairs for the New Jersey Psychological
Association)). The concern is that case managers will interfere with the proper judgments of
physicians. This concern was at the heart of a complaint the New Jersey Psychological
Association filed against a managed behavioral care company. New Jersey Psychological
Association v. MCC Behavioral Care Inc., reported in 5 Health Law Rep. (BNA) 873 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Jun 6, 1996). Among several allegations, the complaint asserts that the managed care
company "substituted its judgment for that of the psychologists concerning the appropriateness
of requested professional services for patients." Id.
191. Rhode Island has enacted legislation along these lines. R. I. Gen. Laws § 27-38.2-3
(1994) (requiring that "health insurers, when making the ... determination of medically
necessary and appropriate treatment [in the context of serious mental illness], must do so in a
manner consistent with that used to make the determination for the treatment of other
diseases").
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
effectiveness measures could be established, considering the differ-
ences that exist between the diagnosis and treatment of mental
health disorders and that of other areas of medical care. 192 Moreover,
these cost-effectiveness measures could still retain some form of bias
against the mentally ill. 193 Effective enforcement of the mandate
would also be an issue, unless utilization decisions were properly
disclosed to patients and a fair appeals process-short of costly
litigation4 --were in place for challenging these decisions.9 5
Though the problems with managed mental health care are
numerous, the move to managed care is inevitable. Politically, it
appears to have widespread support, as evidenced by the comments of
individual lawmakers196 and, more subtly, the MHPA. The mental
health community itself appears to be genuinely split over the issue,
while employers and insurers are attracted by its proven ability to
control costs. From a legislator's perspective the most important
question may not be what to do about mental illness limitations, but
what to do about the unique cost controls of managed care.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite lawmakers' asserted goal of ending discrimination
against the mentally ill, especially those disabled by their illness,
disability-discrimination laws, particularly the MHPA and the ADA,
continue to afford little relief from private insurance limitations for
mental health care. While the elimination of biased insurance prac-
tices is certainly desirable, the question still remains as to what role
the market should play in the shaping of health care plans. Future
192. See note 31 and accompanying text (suggesting that differences do exist between
mental and physical health care). One possible solution would be for Congress to develop the
guidelines for "medical necessity" in mental health care. For a discussion of models of medical
necessity in mental health care, see Sabin and Daniels, 24 Hastings Center Rep. at 10-13 (cited
in note 29).
193. In general, the measure of cost-effectiveness in health care is highly controversial and
potentially loaded with biased assumptions. See Peters, 70 Ind. L. J. at 495-500 (cited in note
100) (discussing the faulty assumptions upon which current assessments are many times based
and how these assumptions can lead to the exclusion of those persons with disabilities from
access to treatment).
194. For a statistical analysis of the legal challenges that patients have brought against
insurance companies in regard to their treatment decisions, see Mark A. Hall, et al., Judicial
Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes,
26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1055 (1996).
195. See Rodwin, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1044-49 (cited in note 26) (discussing the
potential benefits and current limitations of due process and grievance procedures in the
managed care setting).
196. See note 185 (quoting Senator Domenici).
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legislative efforts must seek an acceptable middle ground that
balances the market's concern over high cost and advocates' concern
over restricted access. In so doing, these efforts need to allow for
flexibility in private planning, while securing some guaranteed level
of coverage, at least for those truly in need.
The MHPA may be a step in the right direction, provided its
enactment does not chill congressional interest in the issue. The
rapid evolution of the health care industry, however, may render this
limited enactment fully extinct. Though advocates may be wary of the
"go-slow" approach at this point, perhaps a congressional study into
mental health care would be beneficial at bringing both sides closer
together and clarifying the misunderstandings that persist.
Specifically, a better scientific understanding of mental illnesses may
provide more common ground for employees and mental health advo-
cates. 197 Providing the kind of equality sought by mental health advo-
cates will require the concerted efforts of science, politics, and society
at large.
Even if traditional mental illness limitations are fully elimi-
nated, problems for persons with mental illness will persist. Many
persons suffering from mental illness will remain uninsured.
198
Moreover, discrimination may still persist in the managed care set-
ting in determinations of medical necessity. Even so, managed care,
despite its flaws, has the greatest potential to create a more efficient
and equitable system. Regardless of the health care setting, however,
conflicts between access and cost will continue to create problems for
which easy answers will not appear any time soon.
Christopher Aaron Jones*
197. See note 170 (discussing the possibility of a congressionally-sponsored study into the
biological bases of mental illnesses).
198. See Ramage, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 972 (cited in note 16) (stating that many persons
with mental illness lack private coverage because they are unemployed).
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